MACEDONIAN RELATIONS WITH GREECE

UNDER PHILIP AND ALEXANDER

by

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A thesis submitted to the faculty of
The University of Utah
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Department of History

The University of Utah

August 2009

THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH GRADUATE SCHOOL

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ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the political relationship between Macedonia and Greece between the years of 359 and 323. Through an investigation of the historical evidence available the study finds that this political relationship was not a means of conquest for the Macedonians over the Greeks. Moreover, the study shows that the policies towards Greece of Philip II were largely continued by his son, Alexander the Great.

For my family and friends

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The political relationship between Macedonia and Greece during the reigns of Philip and Alexander changed drastically. When Philip first came to the throne in 359 Macedonia was a backwater of Greece that served as a pawn in the political games of the more powerful city-states to the south. By the end of Alexander's reign the respective roles of the Macedonians and Greeks had reversed completely. Macedonia now stood as the most powerful state in all of Greece and by this power was beginning to create a stable Greek state within the larger Macedonian Empire. Thus over a period of thirty-six years, Macedonia was able to improve her status to compete within and then conquer the elite of Greek society. A major portion of this transformation was the political policies towards Greece set forth and followed by Philip and Alexander. The following work will examine these political policies in an effort to investigate the Macedonian metamorphosi from pawn to king of Greece.

Before this dynamic change in fortune, Macedonia was not a model of stability.[1] To begin, political intrigue including regicide was commonplace in the Macedonian court and shortened many kings' reigns. Moreover, the actual unity of Macedonia was problematic. For all practical purposes, the kingdom was separated into two halves:

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[1] For descriptions of Macedonian internal stability issues before Philip see: J.R. Ellis, *Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976) 36-40, 42; N.G.L Hammond and G.T. Giffith, *A History of Macedonia v. II* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) 167-189; Ian Worthington, *Philip II of Macedonia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008) 221-225.

Upper Macedonia and Lower Macedonia. Lower Macedonia, in actuality eastern Macedonia, was the heartland of the Macedonian kingdom. This area was well developed and controlled by the king. Upper or western Macedonia, on the other hand was just the opposite. This mountainous terrain bred the most unruly of the Macedonians and was a constant source of chaos for the more organized and controlled lower or eastern Macedonia. Despite the best efforts of several kings, these two halves were never truly united until Philip's reign.

Beyond Macedonia's internal struggles, the kingdom also suffered external incursions into her independence from all sides.[2] From the north and the west came the first and most formidable form of trouble. The barbarian tribes of Paeonia and Illyria represented a constant threat to Macedonian security. The Illyrians had occupied most of upper Macedonia and regularly raided down into the lower Macedonian kingdom. By that same token, the Paeonians to the north never hesitated to take what they could from their southern neighbor. To the east, Macedonian economic independence was hampered by the cities of the Chalcidice. Macedonian imports and exports were entirely dependent upon Chalcidian port cities for their trade. As a result the relationship between Macedonia and the Chalcidice was often strained to the point of open war.[3] Finally, to the south, Macedonia also suffered incursions into her politics by Athenian and Theban interests. In this respect, the Athenians were focused on regaining control of their access to the timber resources of the Strymon River Valley in western Thrace. In 369 Thebes compelled Macedonia into an alliance and required that thirty-one noble-born Macedonia

[2] Ellis, 42-44, Hammond, *Macedonia v. II*, 164-166; Worthington, 220-221.
[3] Diodorus, 15.19.2-6; Hammond, *Macedonia v. II*, 175-178 ; Ellis, 42.

sons be given up to Thebes as hostages.[4]

By 359 these external pressures came to a head.[5] The Illyrians attacked Macedonia, defeated the best of the Macedonian troops and in the process killed the king, Philip's predecessor, Perdiccas III. Philip came to power at this point with his kingdom collapsing all around him. The Illyrians could be expected to follow up on their victory by advancing further into Macedonia, the Paeonians were gathering to exploit the current Macedonian weakness and the Chalcidian and Athenians both supported different rivals to the throne against Philip.

Thus, upon his ascension, Philip took control of a kingdom notorious for internal instability and now beset externally by enemies from all sides. It was at this point that Philip began a process of political maneuvering that would transform Macedonia into a world power. This thesis will break this process down into three phases. The first was defined by necessity. Philip had to contrive some plan to insure the immediate security of his kingdom. In relation to Greece, this meant dealing with the threat posed by an Athenian back pretender to the throne (see Chapter III). When this first bout of frantic crisis management had passed, insuring the immediate security took on a new meaning to Philip and pushed him into a second phase of dealing with Greece In this stage, Philip sought to remove the Greeks' potential for continuing their interference in Macedonian politics (see Chapter III). This remained Philip's primary concern until 346, but by this time he had secured his immediate kingdom and began looking to expand his rule eastward (see Chapter IV). From this point on, Philip entered a third phase in his political

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[4] Diodorus, 15.67.4; Plutarch, *Pelopidas*, 26.
[5] Diodorus, 16.2.1-6.

relationship with the Greeks. To expand east required Philip to create a political mechanism to maintain his now prominent position amongst the Greeks and Philip finally did so in the form of the Corinthian League.

Philip died shortly after he had put himself in position to carry out his war of expansion against Persia, but the foundations he had laid for the war were more than sufficient. In fact, his son and successor, Alexander III, did not deviate from Philip's established political relationship with Greece for the first twelve years of his thirteen-year reign (see Chapter V). It was not until his final year as king, when Alexander turned back from expansion eastward, that he made any attempt to change Macedonian and Greek political relations. During this period, Alexander began implementing a dynastic form of governance for Greece intended to create a stable Greek state within a larger empire (see Chapter IV). Ironically, this adjustment in policy might also have been made following precedents set by Philip. Alexander's changes, however, were ill-fated. He died before they could properly develop and his vision was not shared by his successors.

Macedonian and Greek political relations under Philip and Alexander represent arguably one of the greatest reversals of fortune in all of history. In three stages, from 359 to 336 Macedonia rose to prominence by avoiding possible subjugation by Athens in the form of a puppet king, fortifying herself against Greek political interference and, once in a position of power, creating an effective system to govern the Greeks, which also enabled an enormous expansion to the east. From 336 to 324 this system operated effectively, dealing with any and all tests. Finally, in 324, when the war had been carried out to the fullest, Macedonia turned to a long-term solution to create a stable Greek state within the larger Macedonian Empire. The remaining pages will investigate the

respective roles of Philip and Alexander in pushing Macedonia to the forefront of Greek politics.

CHAPTER II

THE SOURCE MATERIAL FOR PHILIP II AND ALEXANDER III

The sources available to the modern scholar regarding Macedonia between 359 and 323 BC are problematic. To begin, there may be no other person in the recorded history of mankind who has been written on more than Alexander of Macedon. On the other hand, his father, while widely esteemed in antiquity, has not drawn the attention of historians and the documents pertaining to his life therefore are not as abundant. Even so, full ancient historical accounts of either man are not only rare, but those that have survived in full are separated by centuries from the men that they describe. The problem for the modern historian then is to assess the reliability of these accounts. Thus, an analysis of the sources' compositions is an unavoidable prerequisite to any examination of Macedon under the reigns of Philip and Alexander.

While the final goal of this analysis will be an historical assessment of the validity of the five surviving full narratives, it will be beneficial first to identify the source material available for use by the authors of those surviving texts. These are known indirectly to us through textual references within the surviving narratives, as well as in extant fragments. Furthermore, these authors represent two levels of separation between the extant sources of Philip and Alexander themselves. First are those authors who lived as contemporaries to Philip and Alexander. The second represents lost works on these men that were written by authors who lived and wrote in the intermediary time period between the death of Alexander and the composition of Diodorus Siculus' history, which

was the first of the extant sources to be produced. The source analysis that follows is organized with the above in mind. This analysis will discuss the pertinent primary sources and intermediary sources, which were available to some degree for the composition of the five major sources. Then it will move to a discussion of the relative merits of the five major extant sources. Finally, there will be a discussion of the material evidence available in coinage, art, and archaeology.

The Primary and Intermediary Sources

There was a wealth of writing pertaining to Philip and Alexander even during their own lifetimes. The works and letters of Isocrates, for example, provide a substantial, if idealistic, insight into the reigns of Philip and Alexander.[6] Isocrates was a prominent pamphleteer, rhetorician and pan-Hellenic statesman of the fourth century. He clung desperately to the idea of a pan-Hellenic union, which could be pitted against the Persians in the East. When Philip brought Macedon into a position of power within the Greek world, Isocrates saw what he believed to be the perfect leader for his conception of pan-Hellenism. This was echoed in his most important treatise the *Philippus*. This investment in the Macedonian state led him to compose letters to Philip regarding Philip's potential to execute his ideals along with personal sentiments. These letters then represent his major contribution to the study of Alexander and Philip and would have been accessible to ancient historians interested in the two kings.

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[6] "Isocrates" (G.L.C.) *The Oxford Classical Dictionary 3rd edition,* Ed. Simon Hornblower and Antony Spawforth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 769-770; Peter Green, *Alexander of Macedon 336-323 BC: A Historical Biography* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991), 570.

The Attic orators during the period of Philip and Alexander provide vantage points that are very different from that of Isocrates' view of Macedonian imperialism.[7] The most prominent of these rhetoricians was Demosthenes whose relevant works include the *Olynthiacs*, *Philippics*, *De Corona*, and *De Falsa Legatione*. Other orators of this period whose works are also pertinent include: Aeschines, Demades, Deinarchus, Hypereides, and Lycurgus. These speeches, unlike many of the contemporary sources to Philip and Alexander discussed below are preserved in full and thus provide the modern historian with a small amount of direct source material by which to assess Philip and Alexander. Clearly caution is the key to any examination of these speeches. They were all rhetorical in nature and thus warp events to fit political ambitions. It is therefore important to take these speeches with those facts in mind, but even as anti-Macedonian as they may be, they still allow a direct glimpse into a past that has been largely lost and thus they retain much value in the present study.

Eumenes, *Hetairos* and secretary to Alexander, recorded a very useful archival-type source for the ancient world. During his tenure under Alexander, Eumenes recorded notes on the actions, orders, religious sacrifices and pronouncements of the king, which were referred to collectively as the *Ephemerides* or 'Royal Journal'.[8] These notes were compiled until Alexander's death at which point they were stolen by Ptolemy I Soter, stored at the library of Alexandria, and eventually published in two different versions;

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[7] N.G.L Hammond, *Philip of Macedon* (Baltimore: 1994) 11; Green, 570, 571; sv "Demosthenes" (G.L.C.) OCD3, 456-458.

[8] N.G.L. Hammond, *Sources for Alexander the Great* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 321; Bosworth, 182-184; sv "ephemerides" (A.B.B.) OCD3, 528.

one edited by Olynthus in Macedonia and the second by Philinus of Akragas.[9] Despite the fact that the Royal Journal is based on notes from Alexander's campaign, it should not be taken as an unbiased source. Eumenes had political motivation behind his composition of this text, namely to enlarge on the feats of Alexander as well as quiet the rumors of his poisoning.[10] The real importance of this document is that it allowed Ptolemy, and therefore Arrian, access to the military details of Alexander's campaign, which would otherwise have been lost.

Ephorus of Cyme was almost an exact contemporary of Philip living from c. 405 – 330 BC.[11] He is thought to be a student of Isocrates and of pro-Athenian sentiment. His major work, now lost, was a thirty-book history, which began with the return of the *Heraclidae* and continued as far as the siege of Perinthus in 340 BC. His son eventually completed the work by carrying the narrative through the Third Sacred War. In this history Ephorus employed both historical and literary sources and gave special attention to migrations, the founding of cities as well as family genealogies. It is the first known attempt at a universal history and thus Ephorus had eclipsed those historians writing

[9] It is important to note a divergence in scholarship over the authenticity of these two publications of the Royal Journals. Traditionally they have been accepted as authentic, having been preserved by Ptolemy and thus indirectly through Arrian. This thesis, however, was countered by Lionel Pearson and his theory subsequently upheld by P.A. Brunt. For a brief account of these developments in the scholarly community see Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander*, 157-158. Despite these arguments against the authenticity of the Journal, the evidence suggests at the very least the Journals were notes taken by Eumenes during the campaigns and then molded into literary form. See N.G.L Hammond, *Three Historians of Alexander the Great* (Cambridge: 1983), 5-11; sv "ephemerides" (A.B.B.) OCD3, 528; A.B. Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* (Oxford: 1988), 157-184. cf. Lionel Pearson, "The Diary and Letters of Alexander the Great", *Historia 3* (1955) 429-439; P.A. Brunt, Arrian: *History of Alexander and Indica ii*, (Cambridge: 1976) 288-293.

[10] Bosworth, *Arrian to Alex.*,157-158.

[11] Hammond, *Philip of Macedon* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 12; "Ephorus of Cyme" (K.S.S.) OCD3, 529-531.

before him at least in scope. His other works included a history of Cyme, a treatise on style and two books on diverse ranges of knowledge in the ancient world.

Ephorus' universal history was important not only in its ground breaking scope, but also for the general good reputation it held as an accurate and authoritative historical work. It was used extensively in the ancient world as a reputable reference for the period that it covered.

Theopompus of Chios was born in 378 and lived through the reigns of both Philip and Alexander.[12] He was a prominent historian of his age and wrote many works including an epitome of Herodotus; a work entitled *Hellenica,* which continued Thucydides' narrative down to 394, and finally his *Philippikai historiai* which was not solely a history of Philip, but rather a universal history centered on Philip. Throughout all these works Theopompus had a common conception of history as universal. He was rhetorical in his composition and moralizing in his tone. Also, it is clear that he was fairly well disposed towards Philip seeing in the King a close realization to his personal political ideals. In his convictions regarding Philip he was at least well acquainted with his subject having spent much time in the Macedonian court. Finally, he was well regarded in the ancient world as a meticulous historian and being a contemporary of Philip and Alexander lends credence to his sequencing of events.

Marsyas of Macedon was the brother of Antigonus the One-eyed and served under him as an admiral.[13] In his younger years he served with Alexander as a Royal Page under the direction of Aristotle. He wrote a history entitled *Makedonika*, which

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[12] Hammond, *Philip of Macedon*, 82; "Theopompus of Chios" (K.M.) OCD3, 1505-1506.
[13] Hammond, *Philip of Macedon*, 15; "Marsyas of Pella" (A.B.B.) OCD3, 930.

chronicled in ten books the achievements of Macedon from the beginnings of the Kingship itself down to 331 BC. Furthermore, he wrote two works on Alexander, detailing Alexander's education and accomplishments. Unfortunately, none of his works have survived in full and what we know of them is derived from quotations by other authors. Marsyas' testimony was important in that he was a Macedonian himself. Thus in his report the ancients had a Macedonian vantage point from which to view the kings as well as a true Macedonian background to the events.

Callisthenes, a member of Alexander's entourage died in 327 BC and thus was witness to all of Philip's reign and the first nine years of Alexander's.[14] In his tenure under Alexander he accompanied the army on its expedition into Bactria, where he was implicated in a plot against Alexander, imprisoned and subsequently died. A native of Olynthus, member of the Royal Pages and nephew of Aristotle, his first attempt in writing history covered the Third Sacred War. He then undertook a project to compose a history that was entitled 'The Deeds of Alexander,' which chronicled down to 330 BC. Despite personal discrepancies with Alexander (quarrelling over the King's requirement for *proskynesis* and his imprisonment, which caused his death), Callisthenes' work was eulogistic in nature, centering on the military achievements and divine paternity of his King.

There is also a text that had been falsely ascribed to Callisthenes though scholars now refer to its author as Pseudo-Callisthenes, since the actual author of the text is

[14] Lionel Pearson, *The Lost Histories of Alexander the Great* (London: Scholars Press, 1960), 22-49; "Callisthenes of Olynthus" (A.B.B.) OCD3, 278.

unknown.[15] This 'Alexander-Romance' was a form of popular fiction in the ancient world based on historical events. It was widely read not long after Alexander's death and its importance lies not within any small fragment of accurate history within the text (there are not many), but rather in the interest that it gained among a wide readership. This text was translated into Greek, Syriac and Arabic by medieval times and thus enjoyed great popularity among a diverse audience.

Aristobulus was a minor engineering officer in the Macedonian army and close companion of Alexander.[16] In the later years of his life, Aristobulus composed his Memoirs in an attempt to refute the current trend, promoted by Cleitarchus, of mythologizing Alexander. His account, therefore, varies greatly from many other accounts in his character judgments of Alexander during this period. One example of this is Aristobulus' denial of Alexander's predisposition towards alcohol, which is found in many other accounts of Alexander's life. It is clear then that in many ways he merely eulogized the King, but he also provided much genuine firsthand logistical information. Finally, his work was a major source for Arrian, which makes his flaws as well as his strengths as a historian of great import for the study at hand.

Nearchus of Crete served in the Macedonian military under Alexander holding a number of important positions.[17] He was an accomplished soldier and statesman. His posts during his career included being satrap of Lycia/Pamphylia, commanding the navy bringing the fleet to meet Alexander and the land force at the mouth of the Tigris, he was

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[15] Albert Mugridich Wolohojian, *The Romance of Alexander the Great by Pseudo-Callisthenes* (New York: Routledge, 1969) 1-21; Green, 571; "Pseudo-Callithenes" (R.B.) OCD3, 1270.
[16] A.B. Bosworth, *A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 27-30; Pearson, 150-187; "Aristobulus of Cassandreia" (A.B.B.) OCD3, 161.
[17] Pearson, 112-149; "Nearchus of Crete" (A.B.B.) OCD3, 1032.

a major figure in Babylon at the time of Alexander's death, and finally, he was a member of Antigonus' staff from 317 to 312 BC. He wrote a memoir of Alexander's campaigns, which is lost except for a few fragments regarding the events of the Indian campaign. It was an important document in the ancient world and was employed as source material by Strabo and Arrian. The fragments that do exist suggest that while his memoir was important for its detail regarding events, it often exaggerated Nearchus' own role in events. Nevertheless, it was a reputable source used by Arrian, Diodorus and Plutarch.

Nearchus' subordinate Onesicritus also provided a first-hand account of Alexander.[18] Onesicritus was a student of Diogenes the Cynic, served directly under Alexander for a time and finally served under Nearchus during the navigation of the Indian coast. He wrote an account of Alexander in the style of Xenophon. What have come down to modernity are fragments that focus on the Indian Brahmans and the kingdom of Musicanus. He also made a detailed description of the sea voyage that is similar in some respects to Nearchus' description. His history, however, was not well received, being regarded as mostly false and those instances in which he may have shown promise as a source, such as his description of the Indus River voyage where Nearchus proved to be definitive, were eclipsed by other authors.

Chares of Mytilene was Alexander's chamberlain. Following Alexander's death he wrote a history of Alexander entitled 'History regarding Alexander,' which was at least ten books long.[19] In this work he put much emphasis on the details of setting as well as the luxury of the surroundings during the latter half of Alexander's Asian campaign.

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[18] Pearson, 83-111; "Onomarchus of Phocis" OCD3, 1068.
[19] Pearson, 51, 60; "Chares of Mytilene" (A.B.B.) OCD3, 317-318.

This was done in less of a moralizing tone with minimal digressions to assess Alexander's character. Rather his interest in conveying this information was based on pure curiosity of Persian wealth as well as a response to reader demand regarding this topic. This proved to be useful for later historians such as Plutarch who were thus able to utilize the details he recorded in their own narratives.

The final witness to Alexander, who wrote a history based at least partially on personal experience, was Ptolemy.[20] He wrote a very influential history of Alexander that derives its importance for the study at hand from the fact that it was used extensively by Arrian. Ptolemy was a childhood friend of Alexander and served the latter as a general throughout his campaigns. His history was at once both an extremely valuable and disappointing source for later historians. His work is valuable, on one hand, in that he records in immense detail information regarding military operations, which was derived from the Royal Journal. On the other hand, Ptolemy was silent on Alexander's character and motives. He would have provided any historian with an accurate account of the military events of Alexander as Ptolemy had access to the Royal Journals for the composition of his history. Thus his value as a source was as an excellent record for the military logistics of the Macedonian army.

Cleitarchus of Alexandria is extremely important in any analysis of the history of Alexander and represents the first of the sources that were written by authors who lived during the intermediary period between Alexander's death and Trogus' history.[21] Son of

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[20] Pearson, 188-211; Bosworth, *Commentary*, 26-27; "Ptolemy I" (A.B.B.) OCD3, 1271-1272.

[21] Pearson, 230-234; Hammond, *Three Historians of Alexander*, 10, ff 83; W.W. Tarn, *Alexander the Great v. 2: Sources and Studies* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1948), 127; "Cleitarchus" (A.B.B.) OCD3, 344.

a historian himself, Cleitarchus wrote what was likely the most popular historical account of Alexander in the ancient world. Though the date of composition for this work is debated, it was written sometime in the period between 310 and 260 BC. Since he wrote so chronologically close to Alexander's lifetime, it is likely that his research utilized almost exclusively eyewitness sources, though he himself was not witness to the events that he depicted in his history. Despite such a great access to quality source material, he was not highly regarded amongst the ancients as an historian. His style of composition was rhetorical and dramatic in nature. Moreover, his accounts of the events were at some points wholly invented to serve the purposes of rhetoric and drama.[22] Nevertheless, Cleitarchus was a fundamental source for Diodorus, Justin and Curtius.

Diyllus of Athens lived during the early third century BC.[23] He was the author of a universal history, which consisted of twenty-six books. The work focused on Sicily from 357 to 297 BC and also included an account of the Third Sacred War, which was similar in effect to Ephorus' history. Very little is known about his work, but through comparative study of Diodorus' sequencing of events pertaining to Alexander and other, better known, ancient accounts of Alexander it seems acceptable to judge his work to be very factual. It was this fact then that encouraged Diodorus and Plutarch to employ him as a source.

Finally, there are sources that may not focus entirely on Philip or Alexander, but nevertheless mention them and provide marginal insights into their respective careers. An example of this type of source is Strabo's *Geography*, which was written in the first

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[22] Pearson, 212-213; Tarn, 131; "Cleitarchus" (A.B.B.) OCD3, 344.
[23] Hammond, *Three Historians of Alexander,* 79-82; "Diyllus the Athenian" (G.L.B; K.S.S.) OCD3, 489

century BC.[24] While Strabo is clearly not focusing exclusively on the Kings, he nevertheless provides instances of history within his work pertaining to Philip and Alexander and thus becomes a valuable check on the information provided by the major sources.

The pertinence of these various primary and intermediary sources to the study at hand is variable. Most of the sources mentioned help only to provide periodic checks on the major sources for Philip and Alexander and thus are not overly utilized in the following paper. The attic orators, however, are extremely useful and potentially misleading. Their perspective on the expansion of Macedonian power provides further insights into Macedonia expansion and therefore has been used extensively in this study.

The Major Sources

Diodorus Siculus

Diodorus Siculus was a Sicilian Greek from the town of Agyrium and was born in the first century BC. He wrote the *Bibliotheke*, which was a universal history with the aim of paralleling events in both Greece and Rome. It was composed in forty books and specifically detailed a history that ranged from mythological ages to 60 BC. The extant pieces of Diodorus' *Bibliotheke* represent the most comprehensive ancient historical overview of Philip and Alexander available to the modern scholar. Of his forty books only fifteen have survived intact, but fortunately for the Macedonian historian books sixteen and seventeen, which begin with the ascension of Philip and end with the death of

[24] "Strabo" (N.P.) OCD3, 1447.

Alexander have come down to us in full.[25] An understanding of Diodorus Siculus as source material is therefore paramount to any investigation into Macedonian affairs between 359 BC and 323 BC.

To understand Diodorus as a source we must first identify those texts that he employed to compose his own history. In the 19th century, it was believed that through analysis it would be possible to identify all of Diodorus' sources, but since then the debate over this topic has continued vigorously. In fact it is impossible to prove definitively exactly what source Diodorus uses in every instance, but there are theories regarding his source material based on sound, if sometimes speculative, logic. N.G.L. Hammond made extensive gains in the understanding of Diodorus' sources in the twentieth century. He posited a new strategy for identifying the source material for the work that was based on the premise that Diodorus' final historical product must have been the sum of the sources which he worked with during composition.[26] Consequently, Hammond grouped Diodorus' work thematically and deduced from these themes the source material from which the historical narrative was derived. Hammond concludes that the three major sources for book sixteen, which centers on Philip, were: Ephorus, for the years from Philip's ascension to 357 BC and a combination of Demophilus and Diyllus' *Syntaxis* as he changes sources. Finally, Diodorus transitions to the exclusive use of Diyllus for the remaining history to Philip's death. Using the same method for the subsequent book seventeen Hammond concludes that Diyllus remained the foundation for

[25] Green, 570; "Diodorus of Agyrium" (K.S.S.) OCD3, 472-473.
[26] Hammond, *Philip of Macedon*, 12-14; Hammond, *Three Historians of Alexander,* 12. cf. Bosworth, *Arrian to Alexander*, 9-10. Bosworth argues that a scene-by-scene comparison of Diodorus to parallel traditions is the only way in which to identify the source material.

the sequencing of the narrative, but that Cleitarchus is then employed for the description of major events of Alexander's career.[27]

If we are to accept Hammond's conclusions regarding the composition of Diodorus' narrative, which in my opinion are well founded, then there are specific conclusions that must be made in regard to the study at hand. First Diodorus' history of the years of Philip's reign is drawn from trustworthy sources. As mentioned above, Ephorus was a widely read historian, lived as a contemporary of Philip and Alexander and his history was widely respected in antiquity being referenced by the likes of Strabo, Nicolaus of Damascus, Plutarch and possibly Pompeius Trogus.[28] Furthermore, Diodorus' transition to Diyllus is understandable as Diyllus' history overlapped Ephorus' for the period of 359 to 341 and was also accepted by the ancients as an historical authority.[29]

His accuracy in portraying Alexander is less reliable. Diodorus' use of Diyllus for the sequencing of events and then coloring these events by using Cleitarchus' account of Alexander requires that Diodorus' analysis of Alexander be used with caution. While his use of Diyllus enables the modern historian to employ his history as a source for the reign of Alexander, his extensive integration of Cleitarchus to more vividly color that reign detracts from his reliability as a source. It is therefore necessary, when implementing Diodorus, to be extremely wary of exaggerations of personality in regard to Alexander during the major turning points of his career. These anecdotes and colorations of the facts promoted by Diodorus through his extensive use of Cleitarchus

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[27] Hammond, *The Three Historians of Alexander*, 79.
[28] "Ephorus of Cyme" (K.S.S.) OCD3, 529.
[29] Hammond, *Philip of Macedon*, 16; "Diyllus of Athens" (G.L.B.; K.S.S.) OCD3, 489.

inevitably debase his reliability as a source for the reign of Alexander. Thus it is safe to conclude that Diodorus is an extremely reliable source through the death of Philip and for what events took place during the reign of Alexander. The manner in which he depicts those events transpiring under Alexander, however, remains dubious. In any case, Diodorus remains a valuable source for the study at hand in that he is writing a universal history and therefore provides insights into both the Greek and Macedonian world.

Pompeius Trogus/Marcus Iunianus Iustinusn (Justin)

Pompeius Trogus was a provincial Roman, living in modern day southern France and his Celtic origin is proved by his cognomen of Trogus, which is from the Celtic word for clan.[30] His family had received Roman citizenship for services to Pompey the Great and his grandfather was the Gallic Secretary to Caesar. The Romanization of his family must have extensively moved him away from Celtic culture so much so that eventually he moved to Rome itself to undertake the task of writing his history.

There are two works attributed to Trogus: *On Animals,* which was a treatise based on Aristotle and Theophrastus, and the *Philippic Histories*. Neither of these works survived antiquity and dating the composition of the latter has been problematic for scholars. Some have argued that a reference in Justin's epitome of Trogus to the names of Caesar and Augustus being given to subsequent emperors indicates that Trogus was writing sometime after the ascension of Tiberius.[31] If, however, that statement was merely an insertion by Justin, then Trogus may very well have been writing earlier.

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[30] Justin 41.5.8; J.C. Yardley and Waldemar Heckel, *Justin: Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus* (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1997) 3; "Pompeius Trogus" (A.H. McD.; A.J.S.S.) OCD3, 1217.
[31] Yardley and Heckel, 4-5.

Unfortunately, there is no way to definitively prove either argument and the only concrete evidence we do have dating Trogus is that he ended his narrative in 10 BC and had criticized Livy's use of direct discourse with the people in his books. From these facts we can infer only that at least some of Trogus' work was written contemporaneous to Livy at the earliest.[32]

Writing sometime between the mid to late Imperial period in Rome, Justin epitomized the *Philippic Histories* of Pompeius Trogus and while there is clearly debate over Trogus, there is equal, if not more debate over Justin. First, while certain facts regarding the life of Trogus are discernable through Justin's text, there is very little that can be employed to achieve better insight into Justin. Second, the problem of dating Justin's epitome, like Trogus, is also a perilous task. Some argue on the basis of textual references that the epitome could not have been written later than 226/7 AD. [33] This is based on a statement within the text that claims that the Parthians rule the East (Justin 41.1.1), which ceased to be a true statement in 226/7 AD. This, however, is not definitive since others argue that it is merely a direct carry over from Trogus and therefore has no bearing on the problem of dating Justin. Third, the nature of the work itself is under question. While Justin is generally conceived of as a poor historian and summarizer, Yardley and Heckel speculate that Justin's work, which he never refers to as an epitome, was rather a rhetorician's attempt to imitate an academic trend of his day, namely, to

[32] Yardley and Heckel, 5-6. Y. and H. also go on to argue the verbal similarities between Livy and Trogus in pages 6-8 thereby further supporting their claim that Livy and Trogus were contemporaries. This argument seems to me tenuous as verbal similarities could occur even if the two authors had not been contemporaries. In fact Yardley and Heckel are most near the truth when they quote Steele as writing, "all that we can definitely know is that some parts of the work of Trogus were written after some parts of the word of Livy."

[33] Yardley and Heckel, 8-19.

shrink down massive historical topics for the use of the schools of rhetoric.[34] Thus we can see that there are numerous historical debates revolving around the composition of both Trogus and Justin.

While these debates certainly hold some relevancy for the study at hand, it is much more important to undertake the task of identifying the source materials that underlay these works. Of these sources no single source has provided more stimuli for debate than that of Timagenes. Timagenes was a rhetorician during the Augustan age who wrote a universal history that was titled 'On Kings.' He was anti-Roman in his sentiments and highly complementary of the Greeks and Parthians. It has been proposed that Trogus' work was a rewriting of Timagenes into Latin, but this view has been largely dispelled.[35] Hammond has proposed that Trogus eschewed the style of his predecessor Diodorus and therefore neglected Diodorus' main source, namely, Diyllus. Instead he chose to focus on Macedonian intrigue by relying heavily on Cleitarchus. Other sources that Hammond cites for Trogus are Marsyas of Macedon and Theopompus.[36] As in the case of Diodorus, Trogus, while integrating sources considered very respectable for their historical accuracy such as Theopompus, was unable to resist some of the fantastic stories of intrigue put forward by Cleitarchus. We must therefore be wary of the personal anecdotes and moral lessons regarding the character of Alexander by Trogus/Justin. These embellishments based on Cleitarchus will inevitably lead away from the truth. This is not to say that Justin's epitome is therefore useless being based primarily on

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[34] Yardley and Heckel, 18-19.
[35] Yardley and Heckel, 30-31; "Pompeius Trogus" (A.H. McD.; A.J.S.S.) OCD3, 1217.
[36] Hammond, *Philip of Macedon*, 14-15; Hammond, *Three Historians of Alexander*, 113-115; Yardley and Heckel, 30.

Cleitarchus. In fact, Justin proves to be very useful since he examines the political actions of Philip and Alexander extensively. Employing this source, however, requires careful comparison with other evidence at our disposal.[37]

Plutarch

Living from c. 50 AD to 120 AD, Plutarch was a major intellectual figure of the early Roman Empire.[38] He was born, raised, and lived for the majority of his life in Chaeronea and consequently was extremely familiar with Athens. He was, nevertheless, well traveled and visited Egypt, Italy and also spent time teaching in Rome. Religiously he was devout to ancient customs to such a degree that he was made a priest at Delphi for the final thirty years of his life. Thus, his efforts at teaching abroad and his prolific writing earned him a lofty and respectable reputation as a philosopher and scholar among his contemporaries.

In the course of his lifetime Plutarch wrote a mass of literature on philosophy, politics and history. A list that survives from antiquity records that Plutarch completed 227 separate pieces of writing. Of this astounding number only seventy-eight of his works have survived to modernity. To cite these works individually here is clearly impractical, but there are four of these which are particularly important to the study at hand namely, the *Life of Alexander, Life of Demosthenes*, *Moralia, Saying of Kings and Commanders,* and the *Sayings of Spartans*. The two lives give us accounts of the age of Alexander through a biographical medium though one must be wary of these accounts because Plutarch's motivation was to parallel Greek and Roman examples of character

[37] Yardley and Heckel, 34-41.
[38] "L. Mestruis Plutarchus" (D.A.R.) OCD3, 1200.

and thus he saw Alexander in terms of Caesar and Demosthenes in terms of Cicero. The *Moralia* are a collection of treatises on moral philosophy with the intention of instructing his audience on the many facets of a moral life in the ancient world. The specific essay relevant to this study is entitled "On the Fortune" or "the Virtue of Alexander." Lastly, the final two sources from Plutarch do not pertain to Philip and Alexander exclusively though there are portions within each text that are attributed to the Kings.

Determining the validity of Plutarch as historical source material is difficult since analysis of his writing has shown that he employed a large multitude of sources.[39] These sources include some of the very best source material available such as Aristobulus, Chares, Marsyas of Macedon and one of the later editions of Royal Journal, not the original. He does, however, rely extensively on Cleitarchus in many instances. The task then of awarding Plutarch an overarching label of 'reliable,' 'acceptable,' or 'unreliable' is all but impossible. The only practical solution is to evaluate him on an event-by-event basis since he is employed as a source in the following study.

Quintus Curtius Rufus

Supposed son of a gladiator, Curtius rose through the ranks of Roman society being trained in rhetoric and adopting a deep fascination for history.[40] During Curtius' rise he became a *novus homo*, who was appointed a position in the senate. Eventually, with the support of Tiberius, he earned a praetorship. He also was a legate in the Upper Rhine region in charge of procuring silver through the mining of the surrounding area. He

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[39] Bosworth, *Arrian to Alexander*, pg. 9 f. 32; J.R. Hamilton, *Plutarch – Alexander: A Commentary* (Oxford, 1969) xlix-lii; N.G.L. Hammond, *Sources for Alexander the Great: An Analysis of Plutarch's Life and Arrian's Anabasis Alexandrou* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 186-187.
[40] "Q. Curtius Rufus" (A.B.B.) OCD3, 416.

was suffect consul in 43 AD and then ended his career as a proconsul in Africa where he died in office.

His active political career did not however suppress his historical inquiry. He wrote a ten-book historical work entitled *History of Alexander the Great.* The title is interesting in that it points towards the Roman conception of Alexander by referring to him as "the Great," rather than his normal Greek epithet up to that time, which was "the Invincible."[41] He wrote this history near the end of the first century or the beginning of the second. The major sources for his work were Diyllus, Ptolemy, Cleitarchus and possibly Marsyas.[42] His work has been subject to many scholarly charges of fabrication and sensationalism and on many levels these charges hold true. His training as a rhetorician often clouds his ability to adhere to any specific idea of the truth and sometimes manifests itself in wholly invented speeches.[43] On the other hand, these arguments cannot be used to claim that Curtius has no value as a source for Philip and Alexander. His use of Diyllus and Ptolemy imply that his observations on Macedonian customs are valuable, but his focus on Alexander's campaigns makes his value as a source in this study negligible.

Lucius Flavius Arrianus (Arrian)

Born c. 86 AD in Nicomedia in Bithynia, Arrian began as a student of Epictetus and concluded this studentship by publishing the lectures of his teacher.[44] He later

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[41] Winthrop Lindsay Adams, *Alexander the Great: Legacy of a Conqueror* (New York: Routledge, 2006) 269.
[42] Hammond, *Three Historians of Alexander*, 159; "Q. Curtius Rufus" (A.B.B.) OCD3, 416.
[43] Hammond, *Three Historians of Alexander*, 137; "Q. Curtius Rufus" (A.B.B.) OCD3, 416.
[44] A.B. Bosworth, *Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander volume i* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980) 1-7; "Lucius Flavius Arrianus" (A.B.B.) OCD3, 175-176.

befriended the emperor Hadrian while in Greece and this relationship sparked his rise into the political structure of the Roman Empire. Hadrian adlected him into the senatorial rank, which subsequently resulted in his holding of a consulate and his later appointment as the legate of Cappadocia. Finally, Arrian retired to Athens where he was appointed archon and lived out his remaining days until his death c. AD 160.

Despite what was certainly an accomplished political career in the Roman Empire, Arrian's real fame in the ancient world was due to his penmanship. Arrian was an eminent author of his age. He wrote prolifically on politics, history, military operations, and philosophy and did so with impeccable literary style, which was based primarily on Xenophon.[45] Of these works his most famous, and as it happens most pertinent to the study at hand, was the *Anabasis of Alexander,* in which he covered the life of Alexander from his ascension to the throne of Macedonia to his death in 323 BC. This work plays an integral role in the investigation into Macedonian politics under Alexander.

Arrian's two major sources in composing his history were Ptolemy and Aristobulus, though he relied more heavily on the former. It also seems likely, due to the richness of detail within his narrative, that Arrian had access to the Royal Journals as well as other accounts by contemporaries of Alexander such as Nearchus. [46] Compiling his history from what were the most reliable sources available to him at the time, Arrian's history is perhaps our most reliable source material regarding the life and times of

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[45] "Lucius Flavius Arrianus" (A.B.B.) OCD3, 175-176.
[46] Hammond, *Sources for Alexander the Great*, 320; Bosworth, *Commentary on Arrian*, 16; "Lucius Flavius Arrianus" (A.B.B.) OCD3, 175-176.

Alexander, but like Curtius, Arrians focus on the campaigns of Alexander limits the value of his work to the study at hand.[47]

Material Evidence

While the literary evidence makes the largest contribution to our knowledge of this period, there is also a body of material evidence that is critical in developing an historical account that is as accurate as possible. A very important portion of this body of material is the numismatic evidence or coinage of Philip and Alexander that has survived to the modern day. Coins are helpful in several ways.[48] First the metal of the coins is an excellent indicator of the economy's health at any given time. Thus, a proliferation of gold coins would suggest a full treasury, while the absence of coins or the use primarily of bronze coins might indicate economic downturn. Moreover, the coins minted by Philip and Alexander give key insights into the political climate during their production. The images printed on coins as well as the other non-Macedonian coins allowed to be minted simultaneously are both references to climate of the period in which the coin was produced.

The second form of material evidence that is available is the epigraphic evidence surrounding Philip and Alexander. Inscriptions in the ancient world were used to make decrees by rulers or governments public knowledge. In the case of Philip and Alexander the inscriptions that have been preserved largely concern the relationship between the

[47] Bosworth, *Commentary on Arrian*, 33-34 calls into question Arrian's "erudition" as a historian pointing out flaws in his depiction of the fall of Thebes and historical understanding of Darius. While these instances are worth noting they do not serve to discredit the relatively large amount of quality information in comparison to our other extant sources.

[48] Otto Morkholm, *Early Hellenistic Coinage: From the Accession of Alexander to the Peace of Apamea*, edited by Philip Grierson and Ulla Westermark (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991) 3-30; Ellis, 235-239.

Macedonian Kings and the Greek world as a whole. [49] There are serious problems when dealing with inscriptions, however, since the majority of those available for study survive only partially intact. Thus it can be difficult to be sure whether an inscription is referring specifically to Alexander "the Great" or some other Alexander in history. Nevertheless, those inscriptions that can be accurately dated and attributed to Philip and Alexander give excellent firsthand insight into the political relationships of Macedon that prevailed during this period.

The next pieces of material evidence to be dealt with are the artistic representations of Alexander. Like the literary sources, the original artistic renderings of Alexander are lost to modernity and the only record we have of these originals are Roman replicas. In addition, completely original works of art were produced as cultures continued to develop their own interpretation of Alexander after his death. The most famous example is the mosaic found in Casa del Fauno, which depicts the battle of Alexander and Darius, but there are many other examples including busts, relief sculptures and statues. While these artistic representations may not be excellent insights into Alexander himself due to their separation from Alexander by hundreds of years, they do provide an interesting vantage point from which to view the conceptions of Alexander during the period in which they were made.[50] Therefore, artwork has a specific use in this historical analysis. When an artistic rendition of Alexander corresponds to an era in

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[49] A.J. Heisserer, *Alexander the Great and the Greeks: The Epigraphic Evidence* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press,1980) xii; B.H. McLean, *An Introduction to Greek Epigraphy of the Hellenistic and Roman Periods from Alexander the Great Down to the Reign of Constantine (323-337)*, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), 1-2 For a full collection of inscriptions pertaining to Macedon see the Inscriptiones Graecae v. X.

[50] Margarete Bieber, *Alexander the Great in Greek and Roman Art* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964) 15-16.

which one of the major extant literary sources was composed, the artwork provides further illumination on the potential cultural biases of the author.

Finally, the archaeological record provides additional evidence that is helpful to an understanding of Philip and Alexander. Macedonia had traditionally yielded only small amounts of archaeological evidence, which displayed a low density rural population, little epigraphic evidence, few temples and an assortment of graves and tombs that become more complex as they reach the fourth century.[51] In 1977, however, Andronikos' excavation of a tumulus in Vergina returned a wealth of archaeological evidence.[52] In the tomb Andronikos found an unparalleled amount of material, much of which involved regal symbolism. In fact, the royal nature of the tomb is the only aspect of this discovery that is widely agreed upon. Andronikos and the Greeks themselves adamantly claim that this is the tomb of Philip II, while resistance to this claim comes largely from American scholarship.[53] The evidence seems to suggest that the tomb is not in fact that of Philip II, but rather Philip III. Even so, the tomb and the material culture found within still give insights into royal burial customs of Macedon and therefore what images were expected by Macedonians in relationship to their royal family.

The material evidence noted above does not represent a major source for the study at hand. While it is interesting, only a limited amount of the extant material evidence is actually relevant to this study. Moreover, most of the small portion of evidence that may

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[51] James Whitley, *The Archaeology of Ancient Greece* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 406-408.

[52] For a record of the artifacts uncovered see: *Treasures of Ancient Macedonia*, edited by Kate Ninou, translated by Helen Zigada (Athens: 1979).

[53] For support of the tomb as that of Philip II see Whitley, 409-410; N.G.L. Hammond, "'Philip's Tomb' in historical context," *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 13 (1978): 387-450. cf. Eugene Borza and Olga Palagia, "The Chronology of the Royal Macedonian Tombs at Vergina," *Jahrbuch des Deutsches Archaologisches Institut* 122 (2007), 81-125.

be relevant cannot be definitively dated. Thus the material evidence is overshadowed by the body of literary evidence.

These then, the literary, numismatic, epigraphic, artistic, and archaeological evidence, represent the full body of source material available to the modern scholar researching Macedon between 359 and 323 BC. There are problems to be confronted in each of these areas, but it is only through that confrontation that one can begin to construct anything close to an objective picture of this period. Without critical analysis of these sources any arguments posited become merely an expression of the author's own desires regarding the subject.

CHAPTER III

PHILIP II, MACEDONIA AND THE NORTH

Philip's rise to power as King of Macedonia occurred during one of the most turbulent periods the Macedonian state had ever endured. Even following his triumph over the myriad of difficulties surrounding his ascension, Philip was still forced to walk a political tight-wire in order to insure the stability of his kingdom within a quarrelsome Greek world. His success in dealing with the Greeks was no small achievement and the political means by which he accomplished this task laid a framework that would become a model for his son either to follow or disregard. This therefore leaves two questions: In dealing with the Greek states to the South what was his political strategy and what tactics did he implement to achieve this strategy? To address these questions, an analysis of the development of Philip's individual political strategies is necessary.

In dealing with the individual decisions Philip made during his tenure as King of Macedonia it must be noted that the political world around him shifted both drastically and consistently during his reign. This adds to the complexity of the narrative, but does not make determining his larger political aims any more difficult. Rather, knowing that Philip's decisions took place in the constant flux of Greek politics is helpful in that any consistencies in his decisions must point to his long-range ambitions. Towards this end, it is helpful to think of Philip's policies for Greece in three phases: the immediate preservation of his kingship and kingdom, protection of the kingdom against potential

aggression, and finally, the stabilization of Greece following The Third Sacred War in a manner beneficial to his own security.

All of these efforts were directed toward the security of Macedonia. In this respect then the consistency in the evidence suggests that Philip developed aggressively decisive short-term policies to deal with immediate threats to his kingdom, but never developed a long-term ambition to bring central and southern Greece under his direct control.[54] Philip expanded, in Greece, incrementally and only out of necessity. He was denied his only war based purely on ambitious imperialistic goals when he was assassinated on the cusp of his invasion of Asia. This was how Philip's story came to an end, but his relationship with the Greek state as King began immediately upon his accession.

'Three Phases' of Immediate Security

Philip's reign began in dire circumstances and it was amidst attacks on Macedonia from all sides that he was forced to develop a strategy to insure the immediate stability of his kingship and the kingdom he had inherited. Athens was finally recovering from her losses in the Peloponnesian War and her ambitions ranged into territory near Macedonia, specifically, the city of Amphipolis.[55] Amphipolis had originally been a colony set up by the Athenians in the fifth century in an attempt to (1) gain access to the vast natural resources around the Strymon River area, (2) to expand their political influence in this

[54]In general there is a two-sided debate over Philip's intentions regarding central and southern Greece. On one hand, scholars such as J.R. Ellis, *Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism* (Princeton, 1976), argue that Philip never made a plan for the conquest of Greece, but rather was consistently trying to put together a safe exit strategy to enable an invasion of Asia Minor. On the other hand, Ian Worthington, *Philip II of Macedonia* (New Haven; 2008) and G.T. Griffith and N.G.L. Hammond, *A History of Macedonia VII* (Oxford, 1979) argue against Ellis in claiming that Philip was an opportunistic expansionist and therefore developed long-term plans for the conquest of Greece before desiring an invasion of Asia Minor.

[55] Sarah Pomeroy, *Ancient Greece: A Political, Social, and Cultural History* (New York: University of Cambridge Press, 1999), 249; Worthington, 13.

area and (3) to protect their grain route to the Black Sea. During Peridiccas III's reign (Philip's brother and predecessor) in Macedonia from 365-360, Amphipolis was an independent city, which was allied to Macedonia.[56] As a result, Perdiccas had sent Macedonian reinforcements to Amphipolis to foil Athenian attempts to bring the city back under the control of Athens. Upon Perdicas' death, however, the Athenians were quick to take advantage of the resulting discord in Macedonia to further their prospects for Amphipolis.

Upon his brother's death, Philip came to the throne, but his hold on that position was a tenuous one.[57] The army was in disarray after suffering defeat at the hands of the Illyrians and any and all of Macedonia's traditional enemies were now in position to push their advantage against Philip, his confused kingdom and disillusioned army. [58] With this opportunity at hand, the Athenians supported a pretender to the throne of Macedonia, Argaeus, with a combined Athenian and mercenary force on the condition that Argaeus return Amphipolis to the Athenians. It was in this first test from the Athenians that Philip displayed his true skill in political guile. Philip knew the importance of the natural

[56] Diodorus, 16.3.3 There is some controversy over the political independence of Amphipolis at this time. Diodorus records that Philip upon recognizing that the recovery of Amphipolis was the Athenian aim in supporting Argaeus, left the city of Amphipolis after first making it autonomous. This is a vague statement from Diodorus, but considering Diodorus was a Sicilian and fully entrenched in the Roman system of alliance it stands to reason that if he understood Amphipolis as allied to Philip then Philip would therefore need to make Amphipolis autonomous in order to end that Alliance. He is therefore simply using a Roman conception of alliance when describing these events. Worthington, 13, 20; Ellis, 48: both of these accounts also conclude that Amphipolis was an independent city at this time that was allied with Macedonia. Cf. Griffith, *Macedonia v.II*, 232-233.

[57] Diodorus, 16.1.3. Cf. Justin 5.7.9f There is a debate over Philip's possible regency period. The debate is irrelevant for the purposes of this paper, but I have followed Ellis' conclusion that the regency never occurred and Philip became king immediately upon the death of his brother. See Ellis, Chapter 1 note 15 and Chapter 2 note 10; Griffith, *Macedonia v.II*, 208-209. Cf. Worthington, 20-21

[58] Diodorus 16.3.5; Demosthenes 23.121; Ellis, 48-52; Worthington, 24-25; Griffith, *Macedonia v.II*, 236.

resources of Macedonia[59] and the role of Amphipolis in controlling them; an Athenian controlled Amphipolis was detrimental to Macedonia as it divided control over the resources surrounding the Strymon River and blockaded him from the Aegean. Losing control or at least influence in this area in the long-term was unacceptable for Philip. However, an Athenian supported rival for the throne outweighed that concern in the short-term. Thus Philip had two objectives when considering the problem posed by Argaeus: eliminate his rival to the throne in the short-term and in the long-term secure his influence in Amphipolis.

Philip achieved both of his goals in a brilliant, yet admittedly backhanded way. [60] First he withdrew his support for the city of Amphipolis and immediately thereafter sought a peace agreement between Macedonia and Athens. In these actions, Philip effectively isolated Argaeus from his Athenian support by implicitly suggesting that if Athens withdrew then Philip would give up claims to Amphipolis. This caused the Athenians to take pause and consider their options. The pro-Athenian message from Philip was clear and consequently Athens decided to back the established position rather than the potential one and withdrew her support for Argaeus. The Athenian general Mantias, in charge of the Athenian forces, fell back to Methone, while sending Argaeus ahead alone.

Shortly thereafter, Philip surprised Argaeus and his mercenary force in a battle near Methone and won readily.[61] Upon victory Philip immediately released the Athenian

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[59] Richard A. Billows, *Kings and Colonists: Aspects of Macedonian Imperialism* (New York: University of Cambridge Press, 1995), 5-11.
[60] Diodorus, 16.3.3.
[61] Diodorus, 16.3.5; Justin, 8.6.

force stationed nearby without ransom and sent a letter to request a formal alliance between Macedonia and Athens. Macedonia, however, had not been the only power in that region to seek Athenian alliance at that time. Demosthenes notes that Olynthus had also asked for alliance.[62] For Athens, an Olynthian alliance would certainly be considered a hostile action towards Philip since Olynthus, situated so close to Pella on the Chaldice, had long contributed to the instability of Macedonia. In any case, Athens decided to reject the Olynthian offer and instead honor a peace with Philip on the condition that he would give up all claims on Amphipolis.[63] Philip had thus achieved his first goal of securing the throne, but at the expense of achieving influence over Amphipolis.

The chess match between Philip and the Athenians over Amphipolis was far from finished. Momentarily, however, Philip's attention was diverted by another power to the south: Thessaly.[64] In 358 Philip was offered an alliance by the Thessalian city of Larisa. Larisa had been in competition with the city of Pherae for dominance within Thessaly. In an attempt to gain ground in their rivalry for power with Pherae, Larisa asked Philip to join them in an alliance. For his part, Philip recognized the benefits to his own security that this alliance offered him. If he could help maintain Larisa's dominance over Thessaly he would have effectively created a friendly buffer state for his southern border.[65] In late 358 or early 357 Philip accepted this alliance, committing at least some Macedonian troops to the cause.

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[62] Demosthenes, 1.7.
[63] Diodorus, 16.4.1; Demosthenes, 7.27.
[64] Diodorus, 16.14.1 Cf. Justin 7.6 For arguments in support of using Diodorus rather than Justin see Griffith, *Macedonia v. II*, 225-227; Ellis, 61 especially note 50.
[65] Worthington, 36-37 makes the point that Philip surely would have remembered Jason of Pherae, who aimed Thessaly's expansion at Macedonia in the early fourth century.

Thus by 357 Philip's political relations to the South were much improved from his ascension in 359. He had subdued the immediate threat to his kingship posed by Athens and forged a mutually beneficially relationship with his southern neighbor Thessaly. He could now turn his attention back to the security issue posed by Amphipolis. Diodorus tells us that it was at this very moment that Philip besieged Amphipolis on the grounds that the people of that city had given many pretexts for war.[66] Consequently, at least a faction of the people of Amphipolis sent two representatives, Hierax and Stratocles, to seek an Athenian alliance against Philip, who was now clearly breaching his agreement with Athens regarding the city.[67] Athens, however, never sent help. There are many reasons why it would have been impractical for the Athenians to support Amphipolis resisting Philip,[68] but it seems that the Athenians were finally placated by repeated promises from Philip that he would return the city to Athens upon taking it.

For Philip, the siege of Amphipolis (357 BC) was a swift one.[69] Assaulting the walls of Amphipolis with siege weapons and battering rams, Philip was able to create a breach in one of the walls. Upon this success, he commanded the army to enter the

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[66] Diodorus, 16.8.2.

[67] Demosthones, 1.5, 1.8; Ellis, 63-64; Worthington, 40-41. Worthington notes that the evidence is unclear in making a definitive determination as to whether these men represented all of Amphipolis or an anti-Macedonian faction within the city. The brevity of the siege, Philip's subsequent handling of the population of Amphipolis and Demosthenes' comment that the people of Amphipolis betrayed their city all lend support to the idea that the resistance was led by an anti-Macedonian faction rather than a full manifestation of disaffection from the population as a whole.

[68] Worthington, 41; Ellis, 64. Both note the siege was timed to coincide with Etesian Wind, which would make sending a fleet virtually impossible. Both authors along with Griffith (*Macedonia v. II*, 238-239) also take into consideration the beginning of the Social War for Athens, which would have diverted any available resources for assistance. Finally, Worthington notes that Athens had no base from which to launch an attack since she had alienated Olynthus by not accepting an alliance against Philip in 359 and therefore had little to no access to the Chalcidic peninsula.

[69] Diodorus, 16.8.1-4.

fortifications and proceeded to take control of the city. Once in control, Philip exiled his political enemies and incorporated the remainder of the population. Now, instead of turning over Amphipolis to the Athenians as promised, Philip instead besieged and forcibly took Pydna, an Athenian ally, further securing the kingdom of Macedonia from the outside influence of Athens. The Athenians, thoroughly embarrassed at falling for Philip's deceit, declared war on Philip.[70]

The ensuing war between Macedonia and Athens began with a mutual courtship of Olynthus.[71] Olynthus was important for a few reasons. First it was a major city within striking distance of Macedonia located on the Chalcidice. Moreover, Olynthus was capable of fielding a sizable hoplite force. Olynthus' land-power combined with Athenian sea-power would have been a serious problem for Philip.[72] Thus Philip's intention in an Olynthian alliance was defensive, while for the Athenians an alliance with Olynthus represented their only practical option for bringing war to Macedonia. The Athenians, however, were incapable of seizing this opportunity. Working actively in the island of Euboea and facing an uprising of their allies, Athens had no resources to spare in confronting Philip in the North.

Philip took full advantage of the situation and negotiated an alliance with Olynthus. [73] The alliance alone would have stemmed any potential Athenian-Olynthian collusion, but Philip separated his potential enemies even further by promising to deliver the city of Potidaea to Olynthus as part of their new found alliance. This was an

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[70] Aeschines, 2.70.
[71] Diodorus, 16.8.4.
[72] Ellis, 65; Griffith, *Macedonia v. II*, 243; Worthington, 40.
[73] Diodorus, 16.8.3.

important political ploy by Philip in that Potidaea was already coveted by Olynthus, but currently was an Athenian ally, held by Athenian garrison. If he could deliver on his promise to deliver the city, Philip could be certain that Olynthus and Athens could never forge an alliance against him. Shortly thereafter, Philip besieged and took Potidaea. He released the Athenian garrison without ransom and presented the city to Olynthus, thereby driving a wedge between Athens and Olynthus.

Philip was also able to stem Athenian influence in Thrace. In 356 Philip took over the city of Crenides, which controlled vast mineral resources and was located near the important Athenian ally Neapolis.[74] He renamed the city Philippi and effectively made it the first Macedonian colony by increasing its population with Macedonian subjects. This new Macedonian colony brought masses of wealth to Philip and mitigated much of the danger posed by Neapolis.[75]

Finally, since the Athenians had been ineffective at preventing any of Philip's moves to this point, Philip moved to finish off the last city that posed an immediate danger to his kingdom.[76] Methone had been the staging point for Athens' support of Argaeus, bid for the Macedonian throne. Philip had taken no action against the city then, but by 355 at least it seems that Philip perceived an independent Methone as a breeding ground for Athenian anti-Macedonian sentiment. On these grounds, Philip launched an attack against Methone in order to seize the last city not under Macedonian control on his seaboard. Despite his early successes in siege warfare, the siege at Methone was more

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[74] Diodorus, 16.3.7, 8.6; Worthington, 45 cf. Ellis, 69-70. Cf. Griffith, *Macedonia v. II*, 249. Griffith suggests that this event happened simultaneously with Philip's seizure of Potidaea.
[75] Diodorus, 16.8.6; Worthington, 45-47; Ellis, 72-73.
[76] Diodorus, 16.34.4-5.

difficult than his previous victories. Philip began this action in 355 and did not prevail until 354.[77] The Athenians continued in their pattern of ineffectual resistance by sending reinforcements too late despite the extended length of the siege.[78]

In 355 the political situation to Philip's South changed dramatically with the outbreak of the Third Sacred War.[79] Phocis, a small power in central Greece, had forcefully taken control of the Oracle at Delphi. The act was highly sacrilegious and the matter was taken up by the Amphictyonic Council. This was a council of states including Thessaly, Phocis, and Thebes, among others, who were all bound by an oath to protect the Temple of Apollo at Delphi. The aggressors, the Phocians, sent embassies to ensure the other Greek states that the temple would be well taken care of under their protection and that the treasuries Delphi housed would not be abused. Even with these assurances, the Amphictyonic Council still declared a sacred war against Phocis for the restoration of Delphi.

Philip's involvement in this conflict was not instantaneous and in fact came about indirectly. In 355 he was still heavily involved in the siege of Methone and controlling his eastern borders. Moreover, the Amphictyonic Council did not immediately ask for his assistance. It was not until two years later, in 353, that a member of the Amphictyonic Council sought Philip's support.[80] Larisa had suffered tremendous losses since the beginning of the Third Sacred War primarily from an alliance between the city of Pherae and the Phocians. Once again, as was the case in 358, the power structure of Thessaly

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[77] J. Buckler, *Philip II and the Sacred War* (Leiden:1989), 181-5.
[78] Demosthenes, 4.35.
[79] Diodorus, 16.33.1-5 For more extensive summaries of the outbreak of the Third Sacred War see Pomeroy, 381-382. Also, Worthington, 54-56; Ellis, 73-75.
[80] Diodorus, 16.35.1.

was in for upheaval unless Larisa could stem the power of Pherae. As a result, Larisa once again sought Philip's help in controlling her long time adversary.

For Philip a request for help from Larisa could not be ignored if his southern border was to be maintained. Sometime following the request Philip himself marched on Thessaly. [81] He joined with his Thessalian allies and moved against Pherae. Pherae in turn called upon her own allies the Phocians, who at first sent only a small detachment. Philip easily defeated this force and Phocis responded by sending her general Onomarchus with her entire military force. The Macedonian army under Philip was defeated twice at the hands of this force.[82] Philip retreated with his army to Macedonia for the winter, holding his soldiers together with great difficulty after suffering their first defeat under Philip. He then returned with his army the following year to renew the struggle. This time, however, Philip was able to convince all of Thessaly to fight in common against Phocis. Consequently, Philip won an overwhelming victory against Onomarchus, thanks primarily to the strength and valor of the united Thessalian cavalry. Many Phocians were killed in rout not only by Macedonian spears, but also by drowning since many fled to the sea.

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[81] Diodorus, 16.35.1-6 cf. Justin 8.2; Worthington, 61. Justin's account of Philip's involvement in this event, from the first two losses to the eventual victory the following year, is condensed into one single battle. Justin creates a story in which Philip is called on by Thebes and Larisa and upon accepting their request swoops in from the north with an army crowned with laurel and defeats Onomarchus and the Phocians. His account in comparison to Diodorus' acccount is an instance in which Justin abbreviated Trogus' narrative substantially and therefore his account of this event including his reference that Philip ordered his army to wear laurel crowns as if the god were marching before the army should be disregarded. Thus Worthington's use of this fact to support his claim that Philip now had serious expansionist aims in southern Greece is wrong.

[82] Polyaenus describes one of these Phocian victories in 2.38.2.

Philip's victory proved to be a great boost in his relationship with Thessaly. Sometime shortly after his victory he was named archon of Thessaly.[83] This lifetime appointment put him at the helm of Thessaly's politics, thus enabling him to safely control the political developments of his southern neighbor. In addition, as an act of goodwill, Thessaly ceded to Philip the territories of Magnesia and Perrhaibia, which both were of strategic military and political value.[84] Militarily, Magnesia was a line of mountains running from Tempe South to Pagasitic Gulf on Thessaly's Aegean shoreline and was of little importance. Perrhaibia, on the other hand, controlled any southern access to Macedonia. Politically, the gift of these territories gave Philip direct control over four votes on the Amphictyonic Council. Finally, to conclude the stability of Thessaly he made serious attempts at quelling the rivalry between Larisa and Pherae by marrying a noble woman of Pherae.[85]

Philip's gains in Thessaly during this period were a double edged sword. On the one hand Philip had made a great amount of progress in his long-time goal of stabilizing his southern border. On the other hand, he had inherited a much larger vested interest in the outcome of the Third Sacred War from this process. Having been given direct control over four of the twenty-four votes on the Amphictyonic Council and having *de facto* control over all of Thessaly's votes through his election as archon, Philip was now one of the major figures within the Amphictyonic league. Thus he was forced to turn his attention to dealing with Phocis and the Third Sacred War as a representative of

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[83] It is important to note that there are no explicit statements of Philip becoming the archon of Thessaly. Rather the evidence available to us is largely indirect from accounts on Alexander and others. See Ellis, chap. III ff. 103 for an explanation of the evidence.
[84] Ellis, 85-86.
[85] Athenaeus, 13.5.

Thessalian interests. In 352 he marched south to bring the fight to Phocis via Thermopylae.[86] Onomarchus' successor Phayllos, however, had been given enough time in the interim between Onomarchus' defeat and the present to prepare for that line of attack. Supported by the Athenians, he blocked the pass from Philip. Philip, seeing no easy solution to this problem, simply packed up and moved northeast to deal with more immediate Macedonian problems.

Due to his initial defeats at the hands of Onomarchus, Philip faced a number of challenges to his immediate security in Thrace and the Chalcidice. First, his ally Cersebleptes, King of Eastern Thrace, turned on him by forging a new alliance with Athens, the terms of which recognized the Athenian right to Amphipolis and pledged to help in its recovery.[87] This was combined with setbacks in Philip's relations with the Chalcidice, as Olynthus, sensing Philip's weakness, also called for an alliance with Athens.[88]

Philip moved first against Thrace. Cersebleptes had immersed himself in a war with his neighbors as he attempted to unite all of Thrace under his rule.[89] Philip's response was to offer his assistance to those fighting against Cersebleptes. The three allies already at war against Cersebleptes, Byzantium, Perinthia and Amadocus King of Central Thrace, gratefully accepted his offer and with their blessing Philip besieged the city of Heraion. Athens saw this as an opportunity to strike at Philip at a distance from

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[86]Diodorus 16.38.2; Demosthenes, 19.84; Justin, 8.2; Ellis, 86-87; Griffith, Macedonia v. II, 279-280 fn 7. Cf. Worthington, 66-68. Worthington's title of this section, "Philip's Attempt to Breach Thermopoylae" errs in accordance with his larger bias of attempting to prove Philip's expansionist designs on southern Greece. Clearly there is no evidence that Philip attempted to breach anything. Rather, finding the pass blocked he simply left to deal with incursions closer to his homeland of Macedonia in Thrace.

[87] Demosthenes, 23.183; Ellis, 87; Worthington, 60.

[88] Demosthenes, 1.13, 23.107; Theopompus, F127 .

[89] Scholiast Aeschines, 2.81.

Athens and after a debate decided to send a force of forty vessels along with forty talents to support their ally Cersebleptes.[90] This idea, however, was never executed out of a lack of initiative. Eventually Philip took the city and once again solidified his influence in Thrace with the support of Amadocus.

He now turned his attention to the Chalcidice and the Olynthians. Following Philip's defeat at the hands of Onomarchus, it seems that Olynthus made overtures of friendship to the Athenians.[91] There is ambiguity within the source material as to Philip's exact response. Philip may have undertaken a small military show of force in 351/0, but clearly his aim was not the conquest of the Chalcidice at this point.[92] As a result, the Olynthians renewed their Macedonian alliance that year, but by 349 relations broke down completely and a full scale war began between Philip and Olynthus.[93] Philip immediately took the war to the Chalcidice.[94] He first took Torone, an allied city of Olynthus. Not

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[90] Demosthenes, 3.4-5.

[91] Demosthenes, 23.10ff; Ellis, 81; Worthington, 75.

[92] Demosthenes 1.12-13, 8.40, 9.56-66; Theopompus FGrH 115 F 127; Ellis, 88-89; Worthington, 69. Both Ellis and Worthington conclude that any venture into the Chalcidice at this point must have been minimal and might have been as small as a verbal warning. Cf. Griffith, *Macedonia v. II*, 298-299. Griffith argues that there was no such action in 351/0, and instead only the actions of 349 took place.

[93] Justin, 8.3 Only Justin gives any reason for the break in relations between Philip and Olynthus recording that it was a result of Olynthus' harboring Philip's two half-brothers and potential rivals. On one hand it was in Philip's best interests to have a pretext for the war so that his actions, at least on the surface, were not blind aggression. Justin characterizes the event in this manner pointing out what he believed to be yet more evidence that Philip was a master of deceit and Worthington agrees.

On the other hand, this may not have been merely a pretext as Justin indicates, but truly a strike against Philip by Olynthus. In other words, Philip would have been satisfied with a diplomatic settlement rather than a military one pre-349. The political climate of Olynthus changed following her warning and reconciliation with Philip in 351 to a pro-Macedonian one. This act, however, may have actually been a revival of attempts at installing her own puppet Macedonian king, which finally manifested itself in Olynthus' harboring of Philip's half brothers. If this was Olynthus' plan then the situation became clear to Philip by 349 and necessitated his aggressive policy against Olynthus. See Ellis, 93-95; Griffith, *Macedonia v. II,* 298-299 cf. Worthington, 74-75.

[94] Ellis, 96. Cf. Worthington, 76-77. The evidence is very limited, but it seems there was a mild disturbance in Thessaly just as war broke out between Philip and Olynthus. No source explains exactly how Philip dealt with this, but Ellis believes that had he himself actually marched on Thessaly, specifically Pherae, then there would be at least some evidence to support this. Worthington suggests, however, that Philip actually fought at Pherae, but gives no supporting evidence.

through siege, but rather through bribery he was able to have the city betrayed to him.[95] He used the same tactic as he moved to isolate Olynthus further by taking her port. Again, he used gold rather than arms to achieve his ends.

As the war began, Olynthus sought the help of the Athenians and the matter went to the assembly.[96] Despite the obvious gains in a defeat of Philip, it took two monumental speeches from Demosthenes (both his first and second *Olynthianic*) to convince the Athenians to act. Finally, the Athenians voted to make an alliance with Olynthus and they sent a force of two thousand peltasts and thirty ships under the command of Chares to help in the resistance. They also sent their general in the Chersonese, Charidemus, to reinforce Olynthus with the eighteen triremes, four thousand peltasts and 150 cavalry under his command.

Though the Athenians had actually been able to send their forces before Philip took the city entirely, they were of little help. By the time they had arrived, Philip had already effectively isolated Olynthus by separating her from her allies by both ground and sea by surrounding the city and taking control of the port.[97] It was only a matter of time until the pressures of the siege were too much for the Olynthians. [98] Philip pressed his advantage, causing an internal collapse of the Olynthian resistance.[99] He bribed two of their chief officials, Euthycrates and Lasthenes, to betray the city to him. With this final

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[95] Diodorus, 16.53.2; Justin, 8.3.
[96] Demosthenes, 21.161; Philochorus, FGrH 49-51; Alfred Bradford, *Philip of Macedonia: A Life from the Ancient Sources* (Westport: Praeger, 1992), 60; Ellis, 98; Worthington, 77.
[97] Diodorus, 16.53.1-2.
[98] Griffith, *Macedonia v. II*, 319; Worthington, 81. Philip may have also put pressure on the Athenians by encouraging the Euboean revolt that year as a means of weakening Athenian support for Olynthus. With this new problem so close to home for the Athenians, their resources were then divided between Olynthus and Euboea and the priority in that division was the close-range problem of Euboca.
[99] Diodorus, 16.53.2-3; Demosthenes, 8.40, 9.46, 19.265, 19.342, 18.48; Justin, 8.3; Worthington pg 79 fn 20.

internal betrayal the city now fell into Philip's possession and he wiped it out. Philip destroyed the city, sold the inhabitants into slavery and sold their possessions for profit.

In taking Olynthus, Philip had also taken all the Athenian reinforcements that had been sent to the city and though his treatment of the Olynthians may have been harsh, his treatment of the captive Athenians was not. [100] The Athenians who were captured during the assault were not killed, but taken prisoner to Pella. Moreover, an Athenian envoy to Philip, Ctesiphon, who was sent to Philip on unrelated business, came back to Athens with more sentiments of peace from the King. It seemed, Ctesiphon related to the assembly, that Philip had regretted being sucked into a war with Athens against his own wishes and he now wanted to open up avenues of communication to negotiate a peace between the two powers. This message from Philip was warmly received by the Athenians and not only did they agree to open up negotiations through a motion proposed by Philocrates, but they also voted Ctesiphon honors for bringing such good news. It was not all euphoria in Athens, however, as some of the citizens still remembered Philip's reputation for deceit. With this in mind then they also passed a motion proposed by Aeschines to send envoys to all the Greek states proposing a unified effort against Philip.[101]

Now, in 347, events transpired that changed the complexion of the political situation between Philip and the whole of Greece south of Thessaly. Having suffered greatly at the hands of a Phocian offensive in the Third Sacred War, Thebes and the

[100] Aeschines, 2.13.
[101] Demosthenes, 19.10, 19.303.

Boeotians turned to Philip for support.[102] Philip's initial response was minimal, sending only a handful of troops, but the practical consequences of this request were monumental. The complexity of the situation was a product of Philip's differing relations between himself, Thessaly, Athens and Thebes. Thessaly was Philip's closest ally. He was, therefore, officially bound to oppose Phocian interests in the Third Sacred War. In this manner he was in line with Thebes and the Boeotians as well, but an annihilation of Phocis effectively meant an affirmation of Thebes as the most dominant state in Boeotia and the Peloponnese. This would almost certainly force Athens into forging an alliance with Thebes. An alliance of this nature would be exactly what he had worked against when preventing an Olynthian-Athenian alliance. Philip could not allow Athenian naval power to pair with any other city that had significant land power for fear of Athenian agitated aggression within the immediate and surrounding territories of Macedonia.[103] Finally, the nature of his own relationship with Athens was uncertain enough to prevent him from moving into central Greece on behalf of Thessaly or Thebes for fear of an attack from the rear by the Athenians.

For the Athenians, who feared Philip's presence in central Greece since it could result in their having to bow to Theban dominance, the Boeotian call for assistance also was extremely alarming. The Athenians had not yet made good on Philip's overtures of peace to this point, hoping that a coalition of Greek states could be formed to oppose him, but despite Aeschines' best efforts there was little support to be found within Greece for

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[102] Diodorus, 16.58.1-3, 16,59.2.

[103] Cf. Worthington, 84-85; John Buckler, "Philip II's Designs on Greece," 83-86. It has also been considered that his prevention of Athenian and Theban alliance was based specifically on preventing an obstacle in his conquest of central Greece. This sentiment is based upon the faulty premise that Philip was already bent on the conquering of this region. The evidence, however, does not support this claim.

an Athenian led, Pan-Hellenic, anti-Macedonian alliance. The only support they found was from the Phocians, who offered them control of the cities that controlled the pass at Thermopylae.[104] This would have been a giant step forward in Athenian plans for resisting Philip, but it was not to be. The Phocian leaders who had offered these cities to Athens were shortly thereafter arrested and the political climate in Phocis immediately changed to a feeling of hostility to Athenian proposals. The new Phocian leaders met Athenian embassies coldly and denied the previous agreement to hand over their cities. Athens was left without any options for defending herself against Philip.

By 346 Athens had received no support for a coalition and had no way of blocking Philip from entering central Greece and therefore was forced to pursue the process of peace. In this regard Athens sent the first of two embassies, which included Aeschines, Demosthenes and Philocrates in early 346 to negotiate peace with Philip.[105] For Philip's part there were five specific requirements for peace between Macedonia and Athens. First and foremost, both parties must recognize what they each controlled to this point.[106] Thus Athens must give up any claims to the territories, such as Amphipolis that Philip had taken since his ascension to the throne. This also applied to Philip in recognizing the Athenian influence on all of the Chersonese, except the city of Cardia, which was already his ally. Second there would be a defensive alliance between Philip and the Athenians with no time limitations.[107] Moreover, this alliance was to extend to

[104] Aeschines, 2.132-133.
[105] Aeschines, 2.18, 2.82; Justin, 8.4.
[106] Demosthenes, 7.26.
[107] Demosthenes, 19.48, 19.143.

both Athens' and Philip's allies.[108] This was done in reference to disputes over Cardia (mentioned above) and Helos, who were revolting allies of Philip being assisted by Athens. Thus Athens would have to respect Cardia on the Chersonese and cease any support to Helos. Finally, the peace would include safe passage for both parties by sea.[109] This was important to both parties, the Athenians in their need to import grain from the Black Sea, but even more so to Philip since his own naval power paled in comparison to the Athenians. Having stressed these points and promising not to go to the Chersonese, Philip left the Athenian ambassadors and headed to campaign in Thrace.[110]

On the surface the peace seems to favor Philip significantly and in some respects it did. Even so, there were definite benefits built in for the Athenians should they agree to these terms. Besides Philip's guarantee not to interfere with the vital grain trade and Athenian influence on the Chersonese, Philip had also made clear to the Athenians during the course of negotiations that he had no intentions of bringing Thebes to eminent power through his involvement in the Sacred War.[111] Instead, if he gained control of the matter he would take actions to promote the status of Athens in the region.

The Athenians took all of this into consideration as well as recommendations from their allies and proposed an emendation to Philip. The Athenian suggested that there should be peace without alliance and this peace should be open to all Greeks to join for three months.[112] In this way, the negotiated peace would be a common agreement among all participants to support, militarily if necessary, the status quo. This was immediately

[108] Demosthenes, 19.158.
[109] Demosthenes, 12.2, 7.14.
[110] Aeschines, 2.82; Demosthenes 19.78.
[111] Demosthenes, 19.42, 19.321.
[112] Aeschines, 3.69.

rejected by Philip, who wanted a peace between Athens and himself, or none at all.[113] The Athenians, seeing that their choice was between a devastating war with Philip and a potentially beneficial peace with Philip, consented to the peace terms.

The peace was confirmed at a second conference in Pella, where many representatives from central and southern Greece came to negotiate with Philip regarding his impending action against Phocis.[114] Though the sources that allow us any insight into this second conference are all Athenian and therefore relate an attitude that Athenian interactions were the most important, it is likely that Philip was interested in the attitudes of all the cities as he prepared to move into central Greece. Aeschines gives us evidence that supports this in relating quarrels from the conference between the Athenians, Thebans, Thessalians, and Spartans.[115] It seems that each group was advocating its own interests in the Sacred War and arguing amongst themselves. It was a chance for Philip to get a first-hand look at the political situation in central Greece and the Peloponnese.

Moreover, as Griffith notes, there is no record of Philip making any speeches during this assembly, which supports the theory that Philip brought this conference together to feel out the political climate.[116] In this process, Philip attempted to placate everyone privately. Through private conversations with at least his high ranking companions, the Athenians were told that Philip would punish the Phocians and the Thebans.[117] On the other hand, he made certain to reassure Phocis that he would turn to support them. In short, Philip displayed to every ambassador present an air of

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[113] Aeschines, 3.72.
[114] Aeschines, 2.112.
[115] Aeschines, 2.136.
[116] Griffith, *Macedonia v. II*, 342.
[117] Aeschines, 2.137.

friendship.[118] It seemed that he distanced himself only from the Thebans, but even so at no point did he take a specific political stance during the conference. In fact, Philip went as far as not signing the alliance with the Athenians until he and all the envoys had left Pella and arrived in Pherae; a two-day march from Thermopylae. In this way, Philip put off any and all political commitments until he was in a position to take Thermopylae no matter how the political structure of Greece might shift.

By the time the Athenian envoys had returned from Pella to finalize the peace with Philip at Athens, Philip had taken Thermopylae and was beginning to implement his plans for ending the Third Sacred War.[119] Already traveling with Thessalian cavalry and at close range to Thebes,[120] all Philip had left to do was to bring Athens by his side so he could be seen as the liberator of Delphi at the head of a Pan-Hellenic alliance and so he sent a request to Athens for soldiers. His request was denied by the Athenians, but their denial became irrelevant when Phalaecus, the leader of the Phocians' hired mercenaries, and his mercenaries surrendered to Philip, followed quickly by their employers, the Phocians themselves.[121]

Thus ended the Third Sacred War and all that was left for the stability of Greece in Philip's eyes was the final punishment of Phocis and reorganization of the Amphictyony.[122] Regarding the latter, Philip was voted two honors. First, he would be

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[118] Demosthenes, 9.11
[119] Demosthenes, 19.51; Ellis, 116.
[120] Demosthenes, 6.14.
[121] Demosthenes, 19.61; Aeschines, 2.130; Justin, 8.5.
[122] Diodorus, 16.60.1-3; Pausanius, 10.3.3; Griffith, *Macedonia v. II*, 452-453 Griffith points out that Philip's ambitions in controlling the Amphictyony cannot be interpreted as the first step in a plan to subjugate all of Greece since the council itself was not Pan-hellenic and was not a relevant power entity to those outside of the club. In fact it was formed from ties between groups in and around Delphi and Thermopolyae. Thus it was only really effective at politically manipulating central Greece.

given the two votes on the council that previously were held by Phocis. This right would also extend to his descendants. Secondly, he was voted president of the Pythian Games, which had not occurred since the beginning of the Third Sacred War. Regarding the Phocian punishment, Philip used his influence to lessen their punishment. The traditional punishment for despoiling a temple was to be cast from a cliff and this punishment was sought by some of Phocis' more dire enemies.[123] The end result, however, was less devastating. All but one Phocian town was razed, the people themselves were relocated into small villages of fifty houses all separated from each other, and finally they were required to repay the amount of money that they had taken from the temple. These punishments would be overseen by the Amphictyony, but the real enforcement of the decrees was done by Philip who based Macedonian garrisons in the new Phocian towns.[124]

Here at the end of 346, having an official alliance with Athens, ending the Third Sacred War, holding a majority of the votes on the Amphictyonic Council, and establishing a general peace throughout Greece, is the traditional point for taking pause to assess Philip. Diodorus, perhaps the father of this traditional pause in the narrative, comments at this point that Philip was anxious to become captain of Hellas to make war on behalf of the Greeks against Persia.[125] So it was that Diodorus believed Philip had not

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[123] Aeschines, 2.142.

[124] Ellis, 124; Cf. Worthington, 102; Buckler 84-85. Ellis suggests that Philip's only intention in the Macedonian garrisons was to temper possible vindictiveness against the defeated Phocis. Worthington suggests that the purpose of these troops was put in place as a backup plan in case Thebes needed to be dealt with as well as to intimidate the Athenians. Buckler posits that these troops were part of Philip's plan, though not fully developed at this point, to take over the whole of Greece.

[125] Diodorus, 16.60.5.

had any aggressive intentions for Greece and by 346 was fully intent on an Asian campaign, and the evidence supports this conclusion.

The first phase in Philip's career as king was the preservation of Macedonia itself and his kingship. In his first year as king, from 359 to 358, it was an all out mad dash of political and military genius focused exclusively on this end. He then moved to a second phase, which involved the removal of meddling influences with the potential to stir up trouble in Macedonia. In doing so, he made every effort not to irrevocably alienate Athens and also acquired significant influence in Thessaly by diplomatic means. Finally, Philip's third objective was to bring the Third Sacred War to an end in a way that promoted general peace among the Greeks and therefore indirectly protected Macedonian interests. Having closely examined Philip's interactions with the powers to the south it must therefore be concluded that to 346 Philip had no intentions of annexing any part of the Greek mainland. Thus Diodorus was correct when he concluded that:

> When Philip had dealt courteously with all, he returned to Macedonia, having not merely won for himself a reputation for piety and excellent generalship, but having also made important preparations for the aggrandizement that was destined to be his. For he was ambitious to be designated general of Hellas in supreme command and as such to prosecute the war against the Persians.[126]

[126] Diodorus, 16.60.4-5.

CHAPTER IV

PHILIP AND GREECE

Well before Philip's kingship and ironically just two years after his own birth the idea of a united Greek campaign against Persia was born. In 380 Isocrates published his *Panegyricus* and for the first time put forward the idea of a cooperative effort of Greek states against the Persians. Thus it is by no stretch of the imagination that Philip in 346 had at least some idea of the benefits of taking war into Asia. In fact, Isocrates himself made sure that Philip was aware of this when he published his Letter to Philip beseeching Philip to lead the Greeks in such a campaign in 346.[127] It should not be concluded, however, that this was the first instance in which Philip considered a Persian campaign. Philip already had his first taste of the profits of expansion and colonization from his experience with Philippoi. Moreover, Philip could not have turned his blind eye to the vast monetary rewards of Asian conquest.[128] Also, if Philip had conceived of a Persian campaign pre-346 he would need an allied Athenian navy and this need would go a long way in explaining his almost inexplicable laxity in dealing with the Athenians.[129]

So it seems that the idea of a Persian campaign had most certainly crossed Philip's mind by 346, but how far his plans had progressed to this point is a matter of

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[127] Isocrates, *To Philip*, 30, 120, 122, 154.
[128] Griffith, *Macedonia v. II*, 460.
[129] Griffith, *Macedonia v. II*, 461. Griffith notes that Philip had many opportunities to press a military advantage against the Athenians such as following the fall of Olynthus, or in a Sacred War after Athens refused to support his actions in 346.

debate. The best evidence in discerning Philip's true intentions are his actions, and his actions to this point, as discussed above, had been defensive expansion. Philip had been securing his kingdom using different strategies from the day he took the throne, and moving into an all out offensive war without achieving this primary goal would have been extremely uncharacteristic of him. It therefore stands to reason that Philip was simply waiting for the right moment to move his attention to the east. He needed a secure kingdom as well as amicable neighbors to move his forces abroad, and achieving both these ends became his primary goal by at least 346.

Towards the goal of keeping good relations with his neighbors to the south Philip had made solid gains in his resolution of the Third Sacred War. He had been personally voted into the Amphictyonic council, as well as elected to preside over the first Pythian Games since the beginning of the Third Sacred War.[130] Both of these were great honors, but, unfortunately for Philip, they did not constitute any sort of permanent or even long-term vow of friendship from his southern neighbors. In fact, despite Philip's hopes, the peace he had engineered was an incredibly tenuous one. First, Thessaly and Thebes were not fully satisfied with Philip's conclusion of the war.[131] Second, Athens, Corinth and Sparta had all been slighted by the Amphictyony, a group now led by Philip, following the war.[132] Finally, Athens was clearly still unsure about whether or not to endorse the new peace in Greece as shown in the court cases between Aeschines and Demosthenes as well as Demosthenes' address to the assembly *On the peace*. It was not until an envoy

[130] Diodorus, 16.60.1; Demosthenes, 5.14.
[131] Demosthenes, 5.12, 20; See also Ellis, 124 fn164; Worthington, 104.
[132] Diodorus 16.60.2; Pausanias, 10.8.2; Demosthenes, 19.327; Ellis, 124 fn. 165, 156.

from the Amphictyony arrived in Athens that the Athenians decided that the peace was in their best interests.

So it was that the peace was a delicate one and Philip spent the majority of the following five years tending to its maintenance. The first problem came in 345 when the Delians, seeking to capitalize on anti-Athenian sentiment within the Amphictyonic Council, brought a suit to the Amphictyony protesting Athenian subjugation of the island.[133] Athens had gained control of the island in the mid-fifth century as she moved from leading member of the Delian League to master of an Athenian empire. The Delians now took this up with the council and somewhat surprisingly, all of the anti-Athenian sentiment did not carry the vote. Rather it seems that Philip must have used his own influence in the council to uphold Athenian claims to the island. In doing so Philip was following his own precedent of pacifying the Athenians whenever it was convenient for him to do so.

The Delian suit had been but a minor hiccup in the peace, but developments in Thessaly threatened to damage the very foundation of Philip's southern security. In his resolution of the Third Sacred War and the reestablishment of the Amphictyony, Philip, being Archon of Thessaly, had favored Thessalian interests heavily by increasing Thessaly's power within the council and in the power structures of central Greece.[134] Despite his efforts, opposition against Philip formed in its traditional locale, Pherae, and more surprisingly in Larisa. The Aleuadian family began asserting itself in these cities

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[133] Demosthenes, 18.134-135; Ellis 130-134; Worthington, 107-108.
[134] Ellis, 137; J. Buckler, *Aegean Greece in the Fourth Century BC* (Boston: Brill, 2003), 451.Cf. Worthington, 110.

and taking steps to challenge Philip's authority.[135] In 344 Philip responded quickly and decisively with military force. He expelled the Alcuadae along with any other opposition to him in the cities. After removing the immediate threats to his power he solidified his gains militarily by installing a Macedonian garrison in Pherae.

Having quelled any potential military uprising in Thessaly, Philip now turned to eliminating the possibility of further dissention in this region. He did so through a massive restructuring of the Thessalian government.[136] Philip subsequently revived the position of tetrarch within the governance of Thessaly. In the fifth century Thessaly had been a better organized territory capable of political and military unity. In the interim, however, polis rivalry had impeded any coordination of the territory as a whole. Philip countered this by his reinstatement of the tetrarchs: four governors for the four traditional regions of Thessaly. There was one major difference in these tetrarchs compared with their fifth-century counterparts: now they were appointed by Philip and responsible only to Philip. Moreover, Philip largely replaced any independent coinage with Macedonian currency. In this way, Philip put an end to any of the political means by which rebellion in Thessaly could be achieved. The insurrection against Philip led by Pherae and Larisa had moved Thessaly from valued ally, supported generously in the Third Sacred War, to a Macedonian subject state.

Perhaps influenced by political fluctuations occurring in even a trusted ally such as Larisa, Philip decided to take steps to reinforce the tenuous peace between Macedonia

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[135] Polyaenus, 4.2.11; Aristotle, *Politics*, 5.1306a;Diodorus, 16.69.8; Ellis, 137; Buckler, *Aegean Greece*, 453.

[136] Demosthenes; 6.22, 9.33, 19.26; Ellis; 139-143; Worthington, 111; Griffith, Macedonia v. II, 533. Griffith, however, dates Philip's reforms to 342 rather than 344.

and Athens.[137] Philip's influence had been growing in the Peloponnese as he was the guarantor of freedom from Sparta for many smaller states. As a result there were grumblings in Athens that this growing influence was part of a plot by Philip to move against Athens. Philip addressed these rumors through an envoy of his allies to Athens headed by Python of Byzantium. Philip's ambassador spoke before an assembly of the Athenians and began by expressing Philip's disappointment at Athenian distrust. Philip had spent the majority of his kingship seeking alliance with the Athenians and in response he was constantly accused of conspiring against them. If they were concerned about his growing influence to the south they should join him in his protection of the freedom of those states against Sparta. This having been, said, Python concluded by conveying Philip's offer to the Athenians that they should propose amendments to their peace with Philip so that they might be reassured of his intentions.

The Athenians were well disposed toward the envoy following his speech. He had calmed the majority of their fears regarding Philip's intentions, but it seems the *demos* was still unable to execute any rational political maneuvering at this point. In response to Philip's request for amendments to the already existing peace, the Athenians made two proposals: First that the original words of the peace that "each side have what they hold," should be changed to "each side have what belongs to them."[138] Second, that their original request for a common peace amongst all of Greece be granted with the terms that

[137] Demosthenes, 7.18-7.22, 7.30, 12.18, 18.136; Griffith, *Macedonia v.II*, 489-495; Ellis, 144-147; Worthington, 112-114; Buckler, *Aegean*, 458-451.
[138] Demosthenes, 7.18, 7.26.

if any state were to take action against any other state, including those not included in the treaty, those states bound by the treaty would move against the aggressor.[139]

Philip granted the second of these requests, but for any Athenian to believe Philip would accept the proposed word change was foolish to say the least. The rhetoric seemed harmless on the surface, but the implication of the change was transparent. The Athenians were once again attempting to lay claim to Amphipolis.[140] To conceive of this as a possibility was naïve, but to have the effrontery to make the claim while Philip was once again reaching out in peace was offensive at the very least. Philip's reaction to the envoy from Athens, which conveyed the Athenian proposed amendments, was less than favorable.[141] Nevertheless, he collected himself enough to give a counter offer to the Athenians, agreeing to the proposed common peace and offering to give them the island of Halonnesus. The negotiation took a turn for the worse as the Athenians denied Philip's 'gift' of Halonnesus since they did not believe it was his to *give*.[142] This was all the arrogance that Philip could take for the moment, and the discussion between Macedonia and Athens was suspended with a less than courteous dismissal of the Athenian envoy from Pella.

Philip's next correspondence with the Athenians came in a letter he addressed to them in 343/2. Known simply as Philip's letter, the letter itself largely complains of

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[139] There is a debate over whether or not Philip was actually the one who suggested a common peace at this time. Griffith, *Macedonia v. II*, 490 and Buckler, Aegean, 460 both contend that the idea for common peace was initiated by the Athenians while Ellis, 145 and Worthington, 112 both purport that it was a proposition from Philip to the Athenians. The evidence does not seem adequate to support the conclusion that the initiative of the common peace was anyone else's other than the Athenians. See Demosthenes, 7.30, 7.18. Both of these support an Athenian initiative.

[140] Demosthenes, 7.23-24.

[141] Demosthenes, 19.331.

[142] Aeschines, 3.83..

Athenian lack of cooperation with his many attempts to establish amicable relations between the two. Philip is clear on this point from the very first sentence of the letter, which reads, "Since I have sent envoys again and again, to ensure that we remain faithful to our oaths and agreements, and you have made no reply, I thought that it was necessary to send you a letter about those matters on which I believe I have been wronged."[143] Philip takes pains for over half the letter (from 12.1 to 12.16) to outline the many grievances he has against the Athenians including their most recent affront in refusing his gift of Halonessus on account of semantics.

After a long harangue against the past actions of Athens, he comes to the point of the letter: to submit that all the grievances between himself and Athens should be decided by arbitration.[144] Philip makes this point and reinforces his desire for a peaceful resolution between the two as he asks the Athenians to "consider this particular point: is it better to reach a judgment by arms or words, is it better to be persuaded by arbiters or by others?"[145] Moreover, he notes that "arbitration would be to the advantage of the people [of Athens]" and follows this point by determining that it is, in fact, the orators of Athens who are effectively preventing a peaceful relationship, which is actually desired by the Athenians as a whole.[146] Having thus addressed his grievances and his wishes Philip finally concluded his letter requesting arbitrations of disputes by writing, "I will defend my just interests, with the gods as my witnesses, and I will support yours."[147]

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[143] Demosthenes, 12.1.
[144] Demosthenes, 12.16.
[145] Demosthenes, 12.17.
[146] Demosthenes, 12.19.
[147] Demosthenes, 12.23.

There are varying interpretations of Philip's objectives in this correspondence. Was the letter simply an announcement that he had had enough of the Athenians and war was on the horizon or was the letter a genuine last plea to the Athenian democracy to see reason?[148] The evidence suggests the latter. Despite Philip's long account of the wrongs done to him by Athens this list actually functions as a rhetorical device by setting up Philip's request to have all their mutual grievances decided by arbitration. Moreover, arbitration was a perfect solution for Philip to seek since whatever decision was made regarding Halonessus, the Athenians would still be placated and if they raised issue over Amphipolis Philip's claim to the city was much stronger as he points out in the final portion of his letter.[149] This letter therefore represents Philip's final plea to the Athenian people. By using the format of a letter he was bypassing the middle men (the Athenian orators) and delivering a message directly to the Athenian people in the hopes that an unadulterated message from the King might allow the *demos* to see reason rather than a political picture mangled by the misrepresentation of anti-Macedonian rhetoric. In the end, Philip had nothing to lose and everything to gain from this letter. Should the Athenians finally accept his efforts at peace as genuine, then he would finally have established the peace he had hoped for since 348. If, on the other hand, the Athenians did not change their demeanor, then at least he had added fuel for the debate and in this way could keep Athens indecisive until war became an absolute necessity. As fortune would

[148] Griffith, *Macedonia v. II*, 495; Worthington, 117; Ellis, 154-157; Buckler, *Aegean*, 469. Griffith and Worthington are of the opinion that Philip's letter was really just a prelude to what Philip saw as an inevitable war with Athens. Ellis and Buckler on the other hand believe that the letter was a genuine attempt to persuade the Athenian people directly that peace with Philip was not only possible, but in their best interest. Buckler makes the best argument stating, "Even though the Athenian temporary retention of the Macedonian garrison broke the Peace, thereby providing Philip with a provocation to war, for the moment he declined confrontation." p. 469

[149] Demosthenes, 12.20-23.

have it, the latter became reality, but just because this is the case does not negate the likelihood that Philip was hedging his bets, hoping for peace, but preparing for war.

If Philip's letter was an expression of his hope that reconciliation might be possible, then that hope was short-lived. Following his correspondence to the Athenians in 342 Philip began taking steps to protect Macedonia from any potential danger posed by Athens. At this time Philip involved himself politically and possibly militarily in three regions of southern Greece: Euboea, Elis, and Megara.[150] Philip moved his military into Euboea to set up a pro-Macedonian tyranny in the city of Oreus.[151] He also expelled the pro-Athenian faction from Eretia and subsequently Porthmus, again installing a tyrant favorable to Macedonia in Eretia.[152] In Elis, Philip confined his actions to financial support of a pro-Macedonian faction involved in civil strife.[153] Finally, his involvement in Megara is historically spotty in the sources, but Demosthenes gives us evidence that a leader in the city, Perillus, sought Philip's aid in deciding some civil strife.[154] It seems that on this front, at least, Philip was unsuccessful.

Philip's relationship with Athens continued its downward spiral the following year as the situation in the Chersonese heated up. While Philip was campaigning in Thrace in 341, the Athenians sent their general Diopithes to solidify their holdings in the Chersonese.[155] He did more than merely protect Athenian assets. Diopithes attacked Crobyle and Tiristasis, areas adjacent to Cardia, and sold the inhabitants into slavery.

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[150] Griffith, *Macedonia v. II*, 496-504; Ellis, 162-166; Worthington, 125

[151] Demosthenes, 9.33.

[152] Demosthenes, 9.57-58, 19.87, 19.324-326; Diodorus, 16.74.1The pro-Athenian party had fled from Eretia to Porthmus as Philip had approached their city.

[153] Demosthenes 9.27, 10.10, 19.260-261; Pausanias, 4.28.4, 5.4.9.

[154] Demosthenes, 19.87, 19.294-296.

[155] Demosthenes, 8.6, 9.15; Griffith, *Macedonia v. II*, 564-566; Ellis, 168-170; Worthington, 126-128; Buckler, *Aegean*, 470-473.

This move was clearly aggressive in nature towards the Cardians, who responded by calling for and receiving support from Philip.[156] Diopeithes' transgressions did not stop there. Upon these difficulties, Philip sent an ambassador named Amphilochus to discuss these matters with Diopeithes. When he arrived, Diopeithes arrested and tortured Amphilochus, releasing him only after exacting a nine-talent ransom from Philip, hardly an olive branch considering the circumstances.[157]

Meanwhile the Athenian position had, at least marginally, recovered. Demosthenes in collusion with Callias of Chalkis was promising a united front of resistance from Megara and Euboea against Philip's aggression.[158] The Euboeans were uniting and they would do so against the Macedonians standing side by side with Athens. A successful military venture added to this success. Phocian the Athenian was able to dispose the tyrant Philip had installed in Eretia replacing him with a pro-Athenian government. Both of these events, if completely true, would have been major victories for the Athenians, but it seems that Demosthenes and Callias had overstated their case somewhat. Aeschines points out Demosthenes' inability to follow through on all of his promises in his speech '*Against Ctesiphon.*' From Aeschines we learn that the armies Callias and Demosthenes promised did not materialize, and furthermore, Euboea never entered into alliance, but rather had formed into a league of her own, which just happened to hold the same anti-Macedonian sentiment as Athens. Thus while in some respects the

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[156] Demosthenes, 12.11.
[157] Demosthenes, 12.3.
[158] For accounts on the relations between Athens and Euboea see Diodorus, 16.74.1; Aeschines 3.95-105; Ellis, 173-174; Griffith, *Macedonia v. II*, 565; Buckler, 473-474; Worthington, 128.

Athenians had made some gains in Euboea, those gains were closer to marginal than major.

Philip for his part was not inactive during this period either, making gains of his own.[159] He had pressed on subduing Thrace and now stood on the doorstep of Perinthus. Perinthus had been Philip's ally, but as the situation between Philip and Athens had polarized, his previous ally began to swing toward the Athenian side rather than the Macedonian. On these grounds Philip laid siege to Perinthus, but it proved no easy task. The Perinthians put up a stout resistance to Philip, who built huge towers to shoot down on the defenders as his army continuously belted the masonry of the walls with Philip's new torsion catapults. The battle was a slow one, but Philip was making headway. He was able to breach the walls, as well as the secondary walls built behind the first. The battle, however, still proved difficult as the buildings within the city were situated on a hill, and thus the attack was uphill through narrow streets.

Despite the stubborn resistance of the defenders Philip was gaining ground. Perinthus had suffered many casualties and was having her own supply problems.[160] Perinthus was hanging by a thread and in this instance they turned to their neighbor up shore, Byzantium. Philip's intentions at this point were clearly not limited to the capture of a single city, and this was no secret to the people of Byzantium. Thus it should come as no surprise that they decided to help their neighbors in resisting and began pouring their resources into the defense of Perinthus. Suddenly finding themselves fully equipped

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[159] Diodorus, 16.74.2-4; Ellis, 174-176; Griffith, *Macedonia v. II*, 571-572; Buckler, *Aegean*, 479-480; Worthington, 131 .

[160] Diodorus, 16.74.4-76.2; Ellis, 178-179; Griffith, *Macedonia v. II*, 573-575; Buckler, *Aegean*, 480-481; Worthington, 131-132.

in supplies and men from Byzantium, the Perinthians redoubled their efforts against Philip and began holding firm. Moreover, the Persian King, Artaxerxes, ordered that the Perinthian cause be supported with all that his satrap could spare. The result was that Philip's siege began to stagnate against the combined forces of Perinthus, Byzantium and Persia. He could no longer make any headway while the city was supported through Byzantium.

With his siege faltering, Philip made one last ditch effort to cut the Perinthians' support from Byzantium.[161] His navy was far too weak to prevent the supply of the city, but Philip judged that the allied city of Byzantium had dangerously overcommitted her troops to the defense of Perinthus. It might be possible then, utilizing the tactic of speed, to move the body of his attack against the walls of Byzantium and subdue that city due to its sheer lack of immediate resources. Philip, therefore, left a small force at Perinthus, invested and took Byzantium's closest ally, Selymbria, and fell upon the gates of Byzantium. As it turned out, Philip's surprise tactic bore no fruit. He found this second city as well fortified as Perinthus, if not better. Moreover, the inhabitants, though "embarrassed" at their momentary lack of supplies, nevertheless drew confidence from Philip's lack of naval power and held out against him.

Philip's attempt at besieging the route to the Hellespont had failed. The motivation behind his attempt at the area was likely a combination of both anti-Athenian policy and a desire to secure a route by which to move to the east. Despite his lack of success in capturing the cities themselves, Philip did at least have some success in

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[161] Diodorus, 16.76.3-4; Justin, 9.1; Ellis, 178-179; Griffith, *Macedonia v. II*, 573-574; Buckler, *Aegean*, 483-485; Worthington, 132-133.

impeding the Athenian grain trade.[162] Sometime during the second siege of Byzantium, the warships in charge of escorting the grain ships were called away to a conference in Perinthus. In their absence Philip's meager navy fell upon the unguarded ships and took every single ship, a total of 230. For the Athenians this was the last straw. The Athenian assembly declared war on Philip, and so in 340 the fragile peace between Athens and Macedonia finally shattered. [163]

For the moment, however, war with Athens was eclipsed by more immediate problems. Following Philip's seizure of the Athenian grain fleet, the Athenian navy rushed out to meet Philip's navy in battle. Philip's force was out matched and easily defeated. As a result of the battle Philip's fleet had been pushed back into the Black Sea and then trapped there by the Athenians. [164] Philip was now on the losing end of two sieges with no naval support and was thus forced to change his direction. He decided to cut his losses and leave Perinthus and Byzantium, but he could ill-afford to chalk up his entire navy, however meager, as a loss. He therefore devised a plan in which a false correspondence fell into Athenian hands, which indicated that he was withdrawing to Thrace. Upon receiving this news the Athenian fleet guarding the entrance to the Black Sea rushed to support an attack on Philip at Thrace. Philip, for his part, had in fact left the

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[162] Didymus, *On Demosthenes*, 10.45ff; Demosthenes, 18.139 Ellis, 179-180; Griffith, *Macedonia v. II*, 575-577; Buckler, *Aegean*, 485-486; Worthington, 133-135.

[163] Demosthenes, 18.73, 18.139; cf. Diodorus, 16.77.2 On one hand Diodorus supports this chain of events when he writes that Athens declared war on Philip as soon as he had besieged the cities of Perinthus and Byznatium. This would make the declaration the same time as the seizure of the grain ships, but Diodorus follows this by writing that Philip dropped the siege on account of this development and made peace with the Athenians. This is incorrect because Diodorus omits the seizure of the grain fleet altogether. Diodorus appears to be creating a version of events to put Philip in a more favorable light. See Griffith, *Macedonia v. II*, 577 fn 1; Ellis, 184.

[164] Diodorus, 16.77.2; Justin, 9.1; Frontinus, *Stratagems*, 1.4.13; Ellis, 182-185; Griffith, *Macedonia v. II*, 579-581; Worthington, 133-134.

besieged cities, but instead of moving to Thrace he had moved to rendezvous with his fleet, now free to meet him south of the Bosporus, and escort the fleet to safe waters.

In this way the sieges of Perinthus and Byzantium came to an end. Philip's prestige had been damaged to some degree, but his power was still largely intact. One might expect Philip to make preparations to move into central Greece, now having open war with Athens. This, however, did not happen. Philip's next move was to take care of loose ends in Scythia to his north.[165] His movement north at this point is problematic for those who push the theory that Philip had always had long-term designs on Greece proper.[166] Had this been his intent, Philip should have moved with all speed south to finally achieve his ends. Rather he set off north to further secure his borders. Not only that, but it seems that Philip also launched into peace negotiations with Athens.[167] In any event, the negotiations failed, and after a year in the north tying up loose ends Philip was finally forced to move south and confront his differences with Athens militarily.

While Philip was in the north, the Amphictyonic Council, possibly at the behest of Philip, caused further problems for Athens. The Lokrians of Amphissa, a small population located just west of Delphi, proposed a motion to the Amphictyony condemning Athens for impiety. [168] The alleged act of sacrilege occurred during the Third Sacred War when Athens rededicated the captured Theban and Persian shields from the Persian War. This act was now considered inappropriate since the sanctuary at Delphi was not reconsecrated until after Phocis had lost the war. The Lokrians' proposal

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[165] Justin, 9.2.
[166] Buckler, *Designs on Greece*, 91.
[167] Diodorus, 16.77.2; Plutarch, *Phocian*, 16.1; Griffith, *Macedonia v. II*, 579 fn 5.
[168] Aeschines, 3.116-129; Demosthenes18.148-151; Ellis, 186-188; Griffith, *Macedonia v. II*, 585-587; Buckler, Aegean, 489-491; Worthington, 136.

was thus a proposal for a sacred war against Athens. Aeschines, well respected by the Amphictyony, met these challenges at a meeting of the Council in 339 and was able to sway the vote against the proposed measure. Unfortunately for Athens, however, this did not end Athenian troubles in Delphi. The morning following Aeschines' defence of Athenian actions, an Amphictyonic procession, headed down from the Temple of Apollo out to the plains, was attacked by Amphissa. This did not directly endanger Athenian relations with the council, but indirectly it began a chain of events that would.

In attacking the procession from Delphi, Amphissa had insured retribution from the Amphictyony. At first Amphissa was fined, but when they refused to pay, open war was declared. The situation was complicated by Thebes, who aligned herself on the side of Amphissa and therefore against the Amphictyony and Philip. Essentially, the Thebans were taking a last stand to keep Macedonia out of Boeotia and in this hope they took control of Nicaea and the hot gates at Thermopylae.[169] This made for an interesting debate in Athens. On the one hand, Aeschines pushed for negotiations with Philip. He believed that the two parties could still be reconciled. Demosthenes, on the other hand, had been waiting for this opportunity. Demosthenes pushed the assembly to open negotiations with their traditional enemy Thebes in order to procure a Theban-Athenian alliance against Macedonian intervention into central and southern Greece.[170]

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[169] Didymus, *On Demosthenes*, 11.44; Griffith, 588; Ellis, 188. Griffith believes that theThebans sided with Amphissa because they recognized that if Philip were allowed to intervene against Amphissa then they would never again exercise the same freedom they had been accustomed too. Ellis on the other hand points to their previous affiliation during the Third Sacred War. Griffith may be crediting the Thebans with more foresight than they deserve, but it does seem probable that they liked their chances of defending central Greece against Philip since he and his major force were all the way north in Scythia and taking Thermopylae posed no problem. If this were their reasoning, they erred merely in thinking they controlled the only entrance to central Greece.

[170] Diodorus, 16.84.5; Plutarch, *Demosthenes*, 18.1.

The assembly sided with Demosthenes and sent every soldier they could muster to Eleusis as they sent their representatives ahead to negotiate with Thebes.[171] Upon arriving in Thebes, the Athenian envoys, which included Demosthenes, were surprised to find envoys of Philip already present and offering Thebes an opportunity to avoid war. Like the assembly at Athens, Philip had also been active during this period in an effort to ensure his own interests. Learning that Thermopylae was blocked to him, Philip and his army had bypassed the main entrance to central Greece by entering through a mountainous pass to the west. As soon as he was through the mountains he made haste for the town of Elateia, took the town and made the Theban position at Thermopylae inconsequential. He then sent representatives to Thebes with a last offer of peace.[172] If Thebes would only remain neutral while Philip undertook a war against Amphissa and give up her position at Nicaia, then there could be a renewed peace between the two powers.

The proposed peace was intended to be palatable to the Thebans. Their position at Thermopylae was useless now anyway since Philip had bypassed it and mere inactivity on their part was no difficult request. But at the very moment that peace might have been possible, the Athenian envoys arrived, and Demosthenes began offering an Athenian alliance to the Thebans. Eventually, Demosthenes' rhetoric persuaded the Thebans to ally themselves with Athens and resist Philip, but only after the Athenians made numerous concessions regarding the eventual conduct of the war.[173] Thebes was to be in sole control of ground forces and hold a joint command over the naval forces. Secondly, the

[171] Demosthenes, 18.177; Diodorus, 16.85.1.
[172] Demosthenes, 18.213; Plutarch, *Demosthenes*, 18.3.
[173] Aeschines, 3.106, 3.142.

Athenians were forced to confirm Theban domination over all other Boeotian cities with the expectation that the Athenians would help subdue any city that stood against Thebes. Finally, the Thebans were only to bear one third of the financial responsibility for the land forces and have no financial responsibility towards the naval forces. With these terms the Athenians, specifically Demosthenes, had bought an alliance with Thebes, but at a steep cost.

Now there was nothing left for Philip but a full-scale military settlement with both Thebes and Athens.[174] The newly formed alliance took up defensive positions north of the Gravias Pass and in the acropolis of Parapotamio. They also sent small detachments to hold any smaller mountain roads that Philip might use to bypass their defenses. Philip responded with another fake correspondence. When the allies got hold of it, they learned of Philip's 'intention' to withdraw his troops. As night fell Philip ordered Parmenion on a full scale thrust through the Gravias Pass and the ruse bore fruit. The Athenians and Thebans were caught off guard and were forced to retreat. Without control of the pass their position at Parapotamio also became useless, and so they were forced to regroup outside of the town of Chaeronea. It was here that the final battle took place.

The two armies met at Chaeronea in the summer of 338. Philip stationed his son on his extreme left at the head of the companion cavalry, opposite the Theban Sacred Band.[175] Philip himself was on the extreme right, facing the Athenian phalanx. As the

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[174] Aeschines, 3.146; Polyaenus, *Stratagems*, 4.2.8; Ellis, 183 fn 17; Griffith, *Macedonia v. II*, 580 fn 3. Both Ellis and Griffith note the similarity of this incident to Philip's ruse to free his fleet at the Bosphorus. Both think that it is unlikely that this deception would work twice, but neither can definitively decide whether this reference in Polyanus is actually referring to the events at the Hellaspont or is correct in its reference to Philip's penetration of the Gravias Pass.

[175] For more extensive accounts of the Battle of Chaeronea see Griffith, Macedonia v. II, 396-603; Ellis, 197-201; Buckler, *Aegean*, 500-505; Worthington, 147-151.

armies stood across the field from one another, Philip ordered a controlled retreat of his forces, baiting the Athenians into pursuit. The Athenians took the bait, and in the haste of their chase the Athenians broke the continuity of their line with the Thebans and thus allowed Alexander to lead a devastating cavalry charge into the gap between the stationary Thebans and the advancing Athenians. Philip then stopped his retreat, turned his right flank to face the Athenian charge and was able to crush the Thebans and the Athenians between his hardnosed infantry and now flanking cavalry. When the fighting subsided, a thousand Athenians had died and two thousand were taken prisoner, and the Boeotians had also incurred heavy losses though our sources are not specific.

Philip was now in firm control of Greece and he was faced with the challenge of personally bringing stability to a region that had not enjoyed anything of the like for all of recorded history. His first action was to settle up with his major enemies.[176] Thebes was forced to pay ransom to recover her dead, endure a Macedonian garrison, recall all of her exiles and accept a pro-Macedonian government of three hundred, appointed from among these exiles. Philip did not disband the Boeotian League, but he did significantly reduce Theban influence within the League so that it would now function truly as a league, rather than a conglomeration to be manipulated by Theban influences.

The Athenians, as was Philip's tradition, were spared the harsh treatment Philip could have enacted upon them.[177] For starters, Philip honored the Athenian dead by returning them under the escort of Alexander, Antipatros and Alkimachos, three highly

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[176] Diodorus, 16.87.3; Justin, 9.4; Pausanias, 9.1.8, 9.6.5. For Philip's settlements with Athens and Thebes, see Ellis, 199-201; Griffith, *Macedonia v. II*, Athens: 606-609. Thebes: 611-615; Worthington, 154-157.
[177] Demades, *On the XII Years*, 1.9-10; Demosthenes, 18.282; Aeschines, 3.227; Pausanias, 1.25.3, 1.34.1; Arrian, 1.7.11.

ranked Macedonians. Athens in kind sent embassy to Philip in Chaironeia to negotiate the terms of the surrender. As the talks began Philip did not begin with punishments, but rather presented the Athenians with a gift as he informed them that the city of Oropos would be taken from Boeotia and given to Athens. In fact, Philip's only punishment of Athens was to dissolve the Athenian naval alliance, but even in requiring this he still allowed the Athenians to retain possession of Lemnos, Imbros Skyron, Samos and Delos. Finally, Philip promised, Athens would remain free and autonomous with no interference from Macedonia.

All that was left for Philip to do was to present his plans to the whole of Greece, and he did this by convening two pan-Hellenic conferences at Corinth in 338/7.[178] At the first conference Philip gathered representatives from all of Greece to lay out his plan for a common peace amongst Greek states. The primary purpose of the peace was the same as what he had envisioned in 346: All states that join would be free and autonomous, and their governments were to be supported along with the territorial claims of each state. [179] In essence, the status quo would be enforced perpetually in Greece.

To ensure that these goals were met in a manner that did not require him to constantly oversee the Greek mainland, Philip designed a system that would enforce the peace even in his absence.[180] First, there would be a council of allies made up of elected representatives from each member in Greece in charge of broadly overseeing the peace. All matters would first be referred to this group in order to settle any disputes. If a breach

[178] Justin, 9.5; Diodorus, 16.89.1-3; Demosthenes, 17.30; Ellis, 204-209; Griffith, *Macedonia v. II*, 623-646; Worthington, 158-159.
[179] M.N. Tod, *Greek Historical Inscriptions v. I* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1948), 177, 5-15; Diodorus, 17.8.10
[180] For descriptions and analysis of Philip's creation of the Leagues see Griffith, *Macedonia v. II*, 623-646; Worthington, 158-159; Ellis, 204-209.

of the peace was unavoidable, or if perhaps the council decided to make war against some outside power, the council would then vote to elect a *Hegemon* to lead the members of the peace against the enemy. The votes allowed to each state were to be determined by the military contribution made by each state.

There was also another group important to the maintenance of the peace, but not fully explained by our sources. There was a group of Defense Officers who were charged with at least two responsibilities.[181] First, they were in charge of having the decrees of the council inscribed and set up at the temple of Athena at Pydna.[182] This was a necessary, if not overly important function, to carry out, but their second known responsibility points to their real significance in the maintenance of the peace. In a speech, Demosthenes writes that the council and the Defense Officers are in charge of ensuring that the members of the peace do not exile or put to death any citizens in a manner not consistent with the law, confiscate any property, redistribute land, cancel any debts, or free slaves to promote revolution.[183] This group seems then to represent a small force of soldiers, directly involved with the council (how exactly, the sources do not convey), who were specifically responsible as a first response team to quell any instigation against the peace before they became full-fledged rebellions.

Thus Philip had created a structured and constitutionally backed system intended as a self-stabilizing device for the whole of Greece. Overseeing the peace were the Greeks themselves in the form of the council, and this council was not without teeth. If needed, the council could either dispatch or count on the Defense Officers, who would

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[181] For an extensive study of the role of the Defense Officers see: Griffith, *Macedonia v. II*, 639-646.
[182] Tod, 183, 12ff.
[183] Demosthenes, 17.15.

maintain the peace by force. An escalation of the situation beyond the abilities of these officers would begin a process of bringing the full force of the common peace against an agitator. The best part, for Philip at least, was that the leader of this force must always be elected by officials from states militarily contributing to the army. Thus, since Philip would always be the largest contributor to the maintenance of the peace, he could always be sure of his election as *Hegemon.*

With the peace in place, Philip called the first meeting of the council later that year. His agenda for the meeting was to propose a war of retribution against Persia and elect a *Hegemon* of the league to carry out this initiative.[184] The motion for war, not surprisingly, was accepted and Greece was now at war with Persia. All that was left to do was to elect the *Hegemon* of Greece, who would carry the war into Persia, and again there was no surprise in this election. Philip was made *Hegemon* and retired to Pella believing he had finally achieved circumstances that would allow him to look solely to the east. As fate would have it, however, Philip would never see the war he had worked so long to make. Philip was assassinated later that year on the eve of his march into Asia Minor, sending reverberations and revolt throughout the Greek world. It was now up to his son and successor, Alexander, to reestablish peace and stability within the Greek world.

Philip II: Asian Expansionist

The previous two chapters were based on the premise that finding the constant in Philip's decisions would shed light on his larger aspirations. Now, looking back upon

[184] Justin, 9.5; Diodorus, 16.91.2, 16.93.6.

Philip's career as a whole, there is one apparent constant. Athens committed transgression after transgression against Philip and Macedonia, yet Philip never once took decisive action to put the Athenians down for good. Even after the Athenians had finally pushed Thebes to war with Philip at Chaeronea, Philip inflicted harsh penalties upon the Thebans rather than the Athenians, this despite the fact that it had been Athens who pushed hard for war and thus continued a long tradition of lashing out at Macedonia as Philip himself pointed out in his letter. Philip's unwavering leniency towards Athens is the variable that explains his ambitions.

As Philip came to power, a courtship of Athens was a necessity, as already discussed above. He prevented Athenian intervention in his kingdom with promises, while at the same time eliminating Athens' potential for aggression by taking all Athenian interests within the immediate range of Macedonia. This fits within the conception of Philip's 'three phases' of insuring the immediate security of his kingdom and explains Philip's laxity toward Athens before she finally declared war on him in 357. For the ten years that followed that declaration, Philip's contact with the Athenians was minimal. It was not until 347 that he again had direct contact with Athens, when he captured, not killed or ransomed, a force of Athenian soldiers while taking the city of Olynthus. Philip then sent Ctesiphon back to Athens with offers of peace and sentiments of regret for the ten years of war that they had endured against one another. Now, however, Philip was in a much different position politically from the one he had been when seeking Athenian goodwill in 359 and 358. Philip was no longer a king fearing the collapse of his kingdom. Now, at the head of Thessaly and about to bring the Third

Sacred War to an end, Philip was arguably the most powerful man in Greek politics. Yet, despite his improvement in fortune, his laxity toward Athens continued unchanged.

Philip's redoubled tactic of bringing Athens to his side from 347 to 337 provides a direct insight into Philip's political strategy. Sometime before 347, but after 357 Philip had concluded that he needed Athens and there was nothing other than an expedition against Persia that could justify this need. Throughout his career he had always recognized the Athenian navy as an incredible and formidable asset. It was in this recognition that Philip had taken action to block both an Athenian-Olynthian alliance and later a Theban-Athenian alliance. If considering an invasion of Asia, Philip could not hope to safely cross the Hellespont and conduct a war in Persia while risking attack from the most formidable navy in the Aegean. He had no intention of leaving behind his hard-fought kingdom for the greener pastures of Asia (as his son eventually did) and therefore could not take on this war without being sure of Athenian intentions. Moreover, he could not simply destroy Athens' navy because to do so would cause another production of the Peloponnesian War, with Macedonia cast as Sparta. Philip with his eye on the east did not have thirty years to waste. Thus Philip had come to need Athens.

With this explanation of Philip's actions towards Athens, his intentions toward the whole of Greece can also be inferred. Philip had no intention of conquering any of central or southern Greece. Rather he needed only to bring Athens to his side so that he could engage in a war with Asia. His attempts to achieve this end, combined with the fickle and obstinate demeanor of the Athenian *demos,* led Philip further south than he had ever intended to go. In the end, Philip could not bring Athens to his side diplomatically and was forced to deal with Greece militarily, but he did so only insofar as it served his

purposes for an Asian invasion. He did not solidify his conquests in Greece by marching south into the Peloponnese and destroying the Spartans, who refused to participate in Philip's settlement following Chaeronea. Rather, Philip merely achieved his aim of finally bringing the Athenians to his side, set up a common peace designed to preserve the status quo and retired to Pella to begin his invasion plans.

Philip's intentions regarding Greece are therefore clear. Early on, he was fearful of the Greeks' interference in his kingdom and limited their ability to do so. As his position improved and his ambitions grew to include expansion into Asia, Philip then made attempts to bring Athens and more importantly, her navy, into alliance with Macedonia. His eventual expansion southward was the unintended consequence of this goal. Philip was an aggressive imperialist, but not toward Greece. He wanted Asia.

CHAPTER V

ALEXANDER AND THE GREEKS

Like his father, Alexander faced challenges from all sides upon his ascension to the throne in 336.[185] He first dealt with his neighbors to the north, but shortly thereafter Alexander had to face the simmering dissention in Thessaly and Greece before it became a boil. In this respect, he dealt first with Thessaly.[186] Marching south from Pella Alexander came to the pass of Tempe in Thessaly and found it blocked to him by the Thessalians. The leaders of Thessaly commanded Alexander to halt, while they discussed their options. The new Macedonian king, however, had other plans. Alexander ordered his engineers to cut steps into the side of the mountain to allow his army to descend upon the rear of the blockading Thessalian army. His strategy paid off. Alexander was able to out maneuver the Thessalians and finding themselves in a rather vulnerable position the leaders of Thessaly opted to negotiate rather than resist. After a reminder from the King about the prosperity Thessaly enjoyed under his father, Alexander was voted the archon of Thessaly with all of the benefits that had previously belonged to Philip.

The next challenge facing Alexander came from Thebes and Athens. The anti-Macedonian initiative was headed by Thebes. [187] Inside the city, agitators had overthrown

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[185] Diodorus, 17.3.1-5; Plutarch, Alexander, 11.1-4; Cf. Justin, 11.1.
[186] Diodorus, 17.4.1; Justin, 11.3; Polyaenus, 4.3.23.
[187] Regarding the rumors of Alexander's death see: Arrian, 1.7; Justin, 11.2; J.C. Yardley and Waldmar Heckel, *Justin: Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus Books 11-12* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 88-89; A.B. Bosworth, *A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander v. I* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 75. Regarding Theban siege of Cadmeia see: Diodorus, 17.8.3-7

the existing government and pushed the Theban people to rise against Macedonia with claims that Alexander had been killed during his campaigns in the north. The Thebans, moved by the agitators and their claims attempted to expel the Macedonian garrison occupying Cadmeia by besieging the citadel of the city. They dug deep trenches and built large stockade around the citadel, but were unable to remove the Macedonian troops from the stronghold. Next they sought the support of neighboring cities such as Athens. Under the influence of Demosthenes, the demos of Athens responded to the Theban request by first sending heavy armor to equip the Thebans, who could not afford the necessary armament to engage in a siege. The Athenians then voted to make further preparations for a collaborative war against Alexander, while Demosthenes himself wrote letters to Alexander's generals in Asia urging them to betray Alexander.

Alexander responded to these challenges with a lighting fast march to take Thermopylae. In six days, immediately following their march over Alexander's steps at Tempe, a Macedonian army of thirty thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry took the Hot Gates.[188] By the next day the army was encamped right outside of Thebes. Alexander, taking a page from his father, resorted first to diplomacy to resolve the situation.[189] He offered the revolting cities peace on the condition that they recognized him as *hegemon* of the Hellenic League, accepted the garrison at Cadmeia, and handed over the leaders responsible for the revolt. As long as the cities complied in this manner

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(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 75. Regarding Theban siege of Cadmeia see: Diodorus, 17.8.3-7 Regarding Athenian support of Thebes see: Plutarch, *Demosthenes*, 23.2; Diodorus, 17.8.5; Justin, 11.2-3; Bosworth, *Justin*, 89-90.

[188] Diodorus, 17.9.3; Arrian, 1.7; Bosworth, *Arrian*, 77.

[189] Diodorus, 17.9.2-4; Arrian, 1.7.7; Plutarch, *Alexander*, 11.7, Justin; 11.3; Bosworth, *Arrian*, 78; Bosworth, *Justin*, 93.

there would be no need for force and the common peace established by Philip for Greece would be restored.

Athens and Thebes responded very differently to Alexander's offer of peace. On the one hand, Athens was quick to comply with Alexander's demands. They sent an apologetic embassy to the king to agree to the terms, while extolling the king for all of his youthful qualities.[190] In light of this, Alexander made good on his promise and peaceful relations between Macedonia and Athens were restored on the condition that the leaders responsible for the rebellion (i.e., Demosthenes) were handed over. Thebes, on the other hand, made no such conciliatory effort.[191] Rather, Thebes incited Alexander to action proposing that he hand over Antipater and Philotas, while proclaiming to all of Greece that anyone who wished to resist Macedonia should stand by their side. This being said, Alexander poured all his efforts into making an example of Thebes to anyone who might dare to resist Macedonian power. The resulting battle was devastating for the defenders, who suffered six thousand casualties in what became a massacre.

After the city had fallen, it fell to Alexander to determine the punishment for those who survived as well as the city itself.[192] Acting as the head of the League of Corinth, Alexander left it to the league to decide the fate of the city. The league, being made up of long-time enemies of Thebes, decided on a harsh punishment. The city would be razed and the citizens sold into slavery. The only exceptions to this verdict were

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[190] Justin, 11.3; Yardley and Heckel, *Justin*, 91.

[191] Diodorus, 17.9.4; Plutarch, *Alexander*, 11.8; cf. Arrian, 1.7; Bosworth, *Arrian*, 78-79. Arrian makes no mention of an ultimatum from Alexander followed by a counter-ultimatum from Thebes. Bosworth notes this, but explains that since Arrian is employing Ptolemy as his source for this incident it makes sense that the destruction of Thebes would be portrayed as out of Alexander's hands, rather than a matter of policy as described in the other source material.

[192] Diodorus, 17.14.2-4, Plutarch, *Alexander*, 11.11; Arrian, 1.9.9-10; Bosworth, *Arrian*, 89-91.

priests, priestesses, supporters of Alexander, and, by personal request of Alexander, any relatives of Pindar. The final verdict of the council having been made, Alexander took action to carry it out thereby putting the final exclamation on an already thunderous message to all of Greece: Rebellion would not be tolerated.

The message Alexander delivered to the Greeks that day was heard throughout Greece and echoed in the annals of history. Alexander's point, however, was not merely a violent threat. Alexander had also sent a very diplomatic message that the final viciousness of the battle overshadowed. Like his father on the eve of the battle of Chaeronea, Alexander had issued an ultimatum intended to be an easy swallow for the rebellious states. Those who accepted this were graciously spared to the point where Alexander did not even insist that they follow through with the actual terms of the ultimatum.[193] Alexander had insisted that Athens give up those individuals who had instigated the rebellion, but Alexander never even forced the demos to give up Demosthenes, though he had led the Athenian effort to join with Thebes. Thus it is important not to overlook the generosity that preceded the carnage. While it in no way lessens the impact of Alexander's harsh treatment of Thebes, it does help rationalize it. Alexander, in his resubjugation of Greece, was implementing the same tactics his father had throughout his career. A velvet glove of diplomacy covered the Macedonian iron fist of conquest and the glove was not to be removed unless the Greeks provoked.

Having quelled the rebellion, Alexander set his eyes on Persia, but by 333 the climate in the Peloponnese changed. Alexander had just won a major victory at Issus and began marching his army south into Phoenicia, while his regent in Macedonia, Antipater,

[193] Diodorus, 17.15.2-5; Justin, 11.4; Arrian, 1.10.6.

was forced to move his army into Thrace. The Spartan King, Agis III, saw the movements of Alexander and Antipater as well as the demeanor of the Persian King following the defeat at Issus as an opportunity.[194] Agis III toured the Greek islands recruiting support for a Lacedaemonian led war of liberation against Alexander in the Peloponnese.[195] He won little support from the Greeks themselves, but he was able to find support from the recently defeated Persian King, Darius. Darius commanded the mercenaries, who had fallen back from the battle of Issus to accompany Agis back to Greece, while also giving the Spartan King large sums of money to support his war effort. When Alexander heard of these developments he sent reinforcements to Greece in the form of a naval squadron.[196] The first objective of the force was to stop Agis' efforts in the islands. They therefore sailed to Crete, where Agis and his Persian support had rendezvoused, in order to prevent any eventual war that might take place on the mainland.

Despite Alexander's intention, however, war on the mainland could not be avoided. Agis was determined to bring the battle to Antipater and had already moved his army to the Peloponnese. The Spartans had accrued enough support to boast an army of twenty thousand infantry and eight thousand cavalry.[197] Moreover, two events in Macedonia transpired, which pushed Agis to act. First, Antipater faced an uprising in

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[194] There is a debate over the chronology of Agis III's war. It revolves around whether the war took place after the defeat of Darius at Issus as suggested by Arrian (3.6.3) or if the revolt took place after Alexander's victory at Gaugamela as Diodorus suggests (17.62.4-63.4). The chronological debate, however, is irrelevant to the present study. It does not change Alexander's actions in relation to the rebellion. For a full account of the debate see: Yardley and Heckel, *Justin*, 184-186; A.B. Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire: The Reign of Alexander the Great*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988) 200 fn 14.

[195] Arrian, 2.13; Diodorus, 17.62.6, 17.48.1-2.

[196] Arrian, 3.6.3; Curtius, 4.8.15; Bosworth, *Conquest*, 200.

[197] Curtius, 6.1; Diodorus, 17.48.1.

Thrace and was forced to meet this with his full military force.[198] At the very same time, Alexander ordered a levy of fifteen thousand infantry to begin their march east to his position.[199] Thus Agis could not hope for a better time to attack. Alexander was moving away from Greece and could not be expected to return in any timely manner, Antipater was already distracted by an uprising in Thrace and to top all of that, Alexander had levied out troops.

With all of these factors in his favor Agis acted.[200] He gathered his army, attacked and defeated a Macedonian force under the command of Corragus. As a result of this victory, Elis, Achaea and later Arcadia, except for Megalopolis, joined in the Spartan rebellion. Outside this support, however, allies were hard to come by. The Spartans had made many enemies throughout Greece and, despite their victory, could not even bring the fickle Athenians to their side. Having achieved moderate success, Agis now turned his attention to the strategically important Megalopolis and laid the city under siege.

Agis had done well to execute his plans as well as he did to this point, but he had made one severe miscalculation. If he had believed that Alexander had substantially weakened Antipater's position in Greece by his levy of troops now marching eastwards, Agis was dead wrong. Upon the Spartan King's rebellion, Antipater was able to settle his accounts in Thrace with a large sum of money that Alexander had sent and move south *en force* to deal with the Spartans.[201] As it turned out, the total force of his army was forty

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[198] Diodorus, 17.62.4-6.
[199] Diodorus, 17.49.1; Curtius, 4.6.30-1; 7.1.37-40.
[200] Aeschines, 3.165.
[201] Arrian, 3.16.10; Bosworth, *Arrian*, 319.

thousand soldiers.[202] Alexander's levy had clearly not weakened the Macedonian military force in Greece. The two armies met outside the city of Megalopolis and a hard fought battle ensued.[203] Agis demonstrated his aptitude as a commander. All the ancient sources relate that the Spartan forces were able to hold the larger Macedonian army at bay for no short while. The discrepancy in numbers, however, proved fatal and eventually Antipater was able to defeat the Spartans and kill the rebellious king through pure brute force.

After the conclusion of the battle, the task at hand was deciding the fate of the rebellious states. Antipater took a page out of Alexander's book and left the decision up to the members of the Common Peace.[204] The states imposed an indemnity of 120 talents on Elis and Achaea with the intention that the money be paid to Megalopolis. The Greeks, however, were unable to decide what to do with the instigator of the rebellion, Sparta, since she was not a member of the Common Peace and therefore asked their *Hegemon* to render a verdict. Alexander ordered that Sparta send hostages and an envoy to defend their actions. As it happened, Alexander, like his father, recognized the value of Sparta's existence in the Peloponnese.[205] Sparta had been unable to find much support from her neighbors, who still held Sparta's actions as the leader of the Peloponnesian League against her. Sparta, therefore, was a divisive city in an area where Alexander could not afford unity. As a result, Alexander did not make Sparta a second Thebes. There is no record of the specifics of Alexander's decision, but equally there is no record

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[202] Diodorus, 17.63.1.

[203] For descriptions of the battle see: Diodorus, 16.63.1-4; Curtius, 6.1.1-21; Justin, 12.1.

[204] Diodorus, 17.73-5-6; Curtius, 6.1.20. On the debate over the chronology of the end of the Spartan rebellion see: Borza, Eugene. "The End of Agis' Revolt" *Classical Philology*, Vol. 66, No. 4 (Oct., 1971) 230-235; Badian, E. "Agis III". *Hermes* v. 95 no. 2 (1967) 170-192; A.B. Bosworth, "The Mission of Amphoterus and the Outbreak of Agis' War," *Phoenix, v. 29, no. 1* (Spring, 1975), 27-43.

[205] N.G.L. Hammond, *Macedonia v. III*, 78; Griffin, *Macedonia v. II*, 618; Carl Roebuck, "The Settlements of Philip II with the Greek States in 338 BC" *Classical Philology v. 43, no. 2* (April., 48), 89.

of any punishment being handed down. Thus it is likely that Alexander judged that their defeat had served its purpose and Sparta no longer represented a threat.[206]

For nearly a decade following Sparta's rebellion, Alexander maintained minimal contact with anything west of his immediate position, let alone the Greek mainland. In fact, it was not until 324 that Alexander again turned his attention to Greece. That year Alexander made two extremely controversial announcements. The King gathered together what had now become his traveling kingdom and announced to all that exiles from the cities of Greece, except those with a blood curse, would be restored to their cities.[207] Moreover, it was time for the Greeks to recognize his accomplishments and to do so, in Alexander's mind, meant proclaiming him a god.[208] He drafted a letter of this announcement and dispatched it to be read to all of Greece at that summer's Olympic Games.

The reaction in Greece was less than appreciative. The request for divine status, while not without precedent, represented a hubris that was blasphemous to the Greeks. Even so, they were willing to let Alexander be a god; it had no practical consequences for them. The return of a city's exiled population, however, would cause a number of problems in every city.[209] First, their property had been confiscated upon their departure and was now either owned by the state or had been sold to other landowning families. Secondly, as was the case in Athens, the exiles had been exiled under the laws of the city

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[206] Hammond, *Macedonia v. III*, 78; Bosworth, *Conquest*, 204; James R. Ashley, *The Macedonian Empire: The Era of Warfare Under Philip II and Alexander the Great* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998) 182.

[207] Diodorus, 17.109.1, 17.113.3, 18.8.2-5; Justin, 13.5.1-8; Curtius, 10.2.4-7.

[208] Aelian, *Varia Historia*, 2.19, 5.12, 9.37; Plutarch, *Moralia*, 219e.

[209] For problems caused by the Exiles Decree see: Bosworth, *Conquest*, 224-225; Hammond, *Macedonia v.III*, 81; John Maxwell O'Brien, *Alexander the Great: The Invisible Enemy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992) 200-201.

and their return was antithetical to their constitution. Finally, most exiles represented fallen political factions that had been ousted in the process of political jousting. Naturally then, those people still in the cities were the political opponents of many of the exiles poised to return. Alexander was not deaf to their complaint, however, and allowed envoys to come present their arguments regarding exiles to him personally.[210] In any event, Alexander died just ten months later and the decree was scrapped.

Alexander: His Father's Son

The Exile Decree and Alexander's request to be declared a god are very interesting developments in his relationship with the Greeks. After almost a decade of complete neglect, Alexander turned his attention wholeheartedly towards Greece, ordering the return of the exiles and 'requesting' to be recognized as a god. Regarding his request for divinity, it is beyond any historian to know, or even guess at what he hoped to gain. There have been only a small few throughout the entire course of history who have been in a position even remotely similar to Alexander's and none of those men were historians. He may have been crazy or rationally implementing a plan towards some end. In either case we will never know exactly. Whether we decide to label it insane or ingenious, what is clear from this action is that Alexander was now very concerned with his standing in Greece and it is within this context that we should view his request for divinity and the Exile Decree.

When Alexander was finally forced to turn back and assess his empire to the west his mentality changed. He still had an intense desire for conquest, but the corruption

[210] Diodorus, 17.113.3.

within his government and problems arising from the disbanding of mercenary armies in his kingdom forced Alexander to consider the difficulties of consolidated such a massive territorial gain.[211] Thus when evaluating Greece in particular, it was clear that the tenuous stability in Greece, created for the sake of the conquest of Persia, was now outdated. In this respect then he formed the Exile Decree to resettle groups of his subjects in a manner reminiscent of Philip's transpopulation movements in 345.

Philip had forcibly expanded the borders of Macedonia before Alexander and in an effort to stabilize the conquered territory he had moved populations in order to (1) inhibit cohesion of his opposition and (2) strengthen his kingdom at strategic points.[212] Before Philip, Alexander I as well as Amyntas had also done the same.[213] Alexander had implemented at least the latter of these strategies throughout his reign, setting up colonies and cities throughout his empire at places he saw fit. Now, however, he would use resettlement to inhibit resistance to his reign and help him consolidate Greece into his empire.[214] The Exile Decree would land the landless mercenaries now in Asia, align them directly with the king, and place this new body of support in the Greek mainland. Their

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[211] For Diodorus' discussion on governmental corruption see 17.108.4-8; For Diodorus' discussion on problems from the disbanding of mercenary armies, 17.111.1.

[212] For accounts of Philip's resettlements of his subjects see: Justin, 8.5-6; See also Ellis, 134-137; Worthington, 108-110; Griffith, *Macedonia v. II*, 660-661.

[213] Griffith, Macedonia v. II, 661-2.

[214] Bosworth, *Conquest*, 220-228; Cf. Hammond, *Macedonia v. III*, 80-81. Hammond argues that the decree was a request from Alexander to the Greeks to readmit their exiles and supports this using Diodorus, 17.113.3 where Diodorus notes that Alexander was allowing representatives from the cities in Greece to argue against readmitting exiles. To accept this argument based on one reference in Diodorus is incorrect. Bosworth correctly notes that Alexander ordered Antipater to use force to coerce those states, who would not comply. This was, as Bosworth puts it, "the language of autocracy."

return to the Greek cities would therefore be an infusion of his partisans to each city, weakening any anti-Macedonian sentiment.[215]

Alexander's death prevented the Exile Decree from developing as he intended, but this initiative does represent a move by Alexander toward an autocratic rule of Greece rather than a leadership role within a common agreement. While it is true that this was a total change from Philip's vision of the common peace, it was not a total deviation from Philip's, or perhaps more correctly, the Macedonian brand of power politics. Alexander was implementing the same strokes of political maneuvering that Philip and other past Macedonian kings had used to consolidate his kingdom. The only difference was now Alexander had acquired a much larger canvas on which to work. The Greek states were now facing what would likely become a new arrangement. They would no longer be free members of a common agreement. Instead, they would now be reorganized into a cooperative district of Alexander's much larger empire. The decree, however, while a turn in policy towards the autocratic, was not a new tactic for an experienced Macedonian king and the time had come for Alexander to remember his role as king after spending so much of his reign as conqueror.

This theory is supported by an incident in the spring of 323 between a group of Greek envoys and Alexander.[216] Antipater had begun garrisoning cities in Greece as his

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[215] Bosworth, *Conquest*, 224-225; Cf. Hammond, *Macedonia v. III*, 81. It is important to note that those who had been exiled during the reigns of Philip and Alexander would not likely be allowed to return home. Bosworth argues that most of these exiles would be easily disqualified from the Exiles Decree by Alexander and the King could therefore guarantee that those headed back to Greece were all his supporters. Hammond, however, argues that Alexander was merely sending anyone and everyone back to Greece and was willing to endure the any "enmity" he incurred. This seems extraordinarily unlikely. If Alexander was sincere and determined to create settled conditions in Greece he could not have hoped to improve the stability of the region by concentrating large numbers of his enemies in Greece.

[216] Arrian, 7.23.2; Plutarch, *Alexander*, 74; Green, 472; Adams, 230-231.

ability to watch over Greece had waned due to Alexander's many drafts of soldiers from Macedonia. In doing so, Antipater was damaging the Greek conception of freedom and autonomy promised by the League of Corinth and the Greeks sent envoys to plead their case to Alexander. At the same time, Alexander commanded Antipater to appear in Babylon in order to defend his actions, but fearful of potential ulterior motives for this order, Antipater sent his son Cassander to speak on his behalf. When the Greek envoys arrived they treated Alexander as if they came to pay him divine honors, anointing him with crowns of gold and Alexander graciously accepted them. Cassander on the other hand, laughed when some Persians preformed *proskynesis* before Alexander and Alexander responded by bashing Cassander's head against a wall. Clearly, Alexander was now nurturing his image as king and god and any slight against this effort was not looked upon kindly. The actual resolution of the Greeks' suit against Antipater would never be resolved. Alexander died shortly after this incident.

These three events, Alexander's reconquest of Greece, his handling of Sparta's rebellion, and finally the Exile Decree and request for divinity, represent Alexander's total political policy toward the Greek states. They are only a small portion of Alexander's career, yet in each the violence, benevolence, vindictiveness and generosity that made up Alexander shows through. What is most interesting is that each episode can be compared so easily to episodes from the reign of Alexander's father, Philip. Alexander implemented Philip's tactics repeatedly while making war against the east and when he turned to consolidate his gains, Alexander merely implemented a different tactic of rule used successfully by Philip in years past. Despite his attempts to conceal it during his

lifetime, in his approach to the governance of Greece, Alexander was truly his father's son.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Macedonian relations with Greece under Philip and Alexander represent one of the greatest role reversals in all of history. Philip took a kingdom on the brink of destruction and turned it into the leader of the Greek world. The preceding study has shown, however, that Philip's primary concern was always the safety and security of his kingdom. Philip did not come to the throne with any long-term plan for the subjugation of Greece nor were these thoughts a part of Philip's conception until his full-scale involvement in the Third Sacred War. The evidence clearly shows that Philip developed his policies towards Greece in three stages during his kingship: First stopping the Athenians from supplanting him, then moving to remove the potential threats the Greeks posed to his immediate security and finally, creating a peaceful settlement of affairs in Greece to allow him to turn his back and invade Asia.

Philip was immediately successful in these first two stages of protecting Macedonia, but the third stage proved a struggle. Before he became involved in settling Greek affairs, Philip was all too aware of the difficulty it would pose and avoided involving himself too intimately in Greece (i.e., actually occupying any part of Greece militarily) until it was absolutely necessary. Philip was dragged into the Third Sacred War by way of his obligations to Thessaly along with a request from Thebes. It was at that point, when Philip had no other option that direct confrontation that the stability of Greece became a security concern for Macedonia.

Philip's first effort at dealing with this matter was a failure. His power within the Delphic Amphictyony proved to be insufficient. He was not able to appease all parties in his settlement of the Third Sacred War and the peace he negotiated afterward. Moreover, his privileged position at Delphi was not powerful enough to calm the unrest and so after tending to a tenuous peace for four years Philip was forced to begin considering solidifying his position militarily. He did this well and his victory at Chaeronea allowed him a second opportunity to address the stability of Greece. He did so in the form of the Corinthian League. Brilliantly, Philip developed a peace that was, on the surface at least, for Greeks and by Greeks. Thus he saved their sensibilities by allowing them a degree of freedom and autonomy in the form of a Greek council overseeing the peace, but also provided provisions for large-scale Macedonian military intervention should any problems arise.

After Philip's death, Alexander's continued relationship with the Greeks stands as a testament to the success of Philip's political policies toward Greece. When Alexander had quelled the initial disturbances resulting from his father's death, he merely reinstated all the political mechanisms that his father had created, including the Corinthian League. This league, overseen by the council of Greeks and Antipater, served him well for twelve of his thirteen years as king. Philip's system was able to manage a full-scale, Spartan-led, Persian-backed rebellion within Greece all while the *hegemon* of the League was far off in Asia. When Alexander finally did begin changing his father's policy towards Greece it was not because the system Philip had created was no longer functioning, but rather because Alexander now envisioned a larger Macedonian Empire than his father ever had. Alexander's Macedonia had engulfed the entire known world and Greece was but one

part in his much larger empire. His decisions during the last year of his reign are consistent with this interpretation as he began to take steps to make Greece into province loyal to an emperor.

By the time of Alexander's death, Macedonia had come to regulate her relationship with Greece to the point that Alexander could consider carrying out decisions outside the 'legal' workings of the League of Corinth. This level of prominence was made possible by the political maneuvering of Alexander's father, Philip. Philip's expert execution of his developmental three stages of securing Macedonia was not only the foundation of Macedonia's political policies towards Greece; it was the definition of those policies for almost the entire period of 359 to 323. From rags to riches, Macedonia developed from a backwater of Greece into the most dominant political entity in all of Greece. The policies implemented and executed by Philip and Alexander were largely responsible for this result.

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